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Abstract	  	   Understanding	  the	  risk	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  sexual	  offending	  against	  children	  is	  an	  important	  topic	  for	  research.	  The	  present	  study	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  whether	  deficits	  in	  emotion	  recognition	  might	  contribute	  to	  sexual	  offending,	  by	  testing	  if	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  were	  impaired	  in	  their	  recognition	  of	  facial	  expressions	  of	  emotion,	  particularly	  with	  children,	  relative	  to	  non-­‐offender	  controls.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  tested	  49	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  and	  46	  non-­‐offender	  controls	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  recognise	  facial	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  using	  photographs	  of	  both	  adults	  and	  children	  posing	  emotions	  from	  the	  Radboud	  Faces	  Database	  (Langner	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  We	  created	  continua	  along	  six	  emotion	  pairs	  (e.g.	  happiness-­‐sadness)	  in	  10%	  increments,	  from	  the	  emotions	  of	  sadness,	  anger,	  happiness,	  and	  fear,	  with	  morphing	  software.	  	  Using	  signal	  detection	  analyses,	  we	  found	  that	  across	  the	  emotion	  pairs,	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  significantly	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  than	  offenders,	  although	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  within	  individual	  emotion	  pairs,	  and	  was	  not	  significant	  with	  either	  age	  or	  level	  of	  education	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  When	  discriminating	  between	  fear	  and	  anger,	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  significant	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  an	  emotion	  as	  fear	  when	  judging	  male	  faces,	  whereas	  offenders	  did	  not,	  and	  this	  difference	  remained	  significant	  with	  age,	  level	  of	  education	  and	  socioeconomic	  status	  as	  covariates.	  Additionally,	  both	  groups	  showed	  a	  strong	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  an	  emotion	  as	  anger	  when	  judging	  female	  faces.	  Thus	  sexual	  offenders	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  identify	  anger	  rather	  than	  fear	  with	  male	  faces,	  suggesting	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  lack	  an	  inhibition	  against	  recognising	  anger	  in	  males	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  showed.	  	  Overall,	  contrary	  to	  our	  predictions,	  we	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  showed	  a	  specific	  deficit	  in	  their	  recognition	  of	  emotions	  in	  children.	  However,	  future	  research	  should	  continue	  to	  examine	  this	  area	  and	  its	  potential	  link	  to	  recidivism.	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1. Introduction	  and	  General	  Theory	  
	   The	  experience	  of	  emotions	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  our	  lives.	  Our	  emotions	  influence	  us	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  such	  as	  relationship	  building,	  decision	  making,	  and	  forming	  attitudes,	  and	  can	  help	  keep	  us	  safe	  from	  danger.	  Emotions	  have	  evolved	  through	  adaptation	  to	  our	  surroundings	  over	  many	  generations	  (phylogenetic	  contribution)	  and	  continue	  to	  develop	  through	  social	  learning	  over	  our	  own	  lifespan,	  especially	  during	  infancy	  and	  childhood	  (ontogenetic	  contribution)	  (Ekman	  &	  Cordaro,	  2011).	  According	  to	  Ekman	  (1999,	  p.172)	  “Each	  of	  the	  basic	  emotions	  [fear,	  sadness,	  happiness,	  anger,	  contempt,	  disgust,	  and	  surprise]	  is	  not	  a	  single	  affective	  state	  but	  a	  family	  of	  related	  states.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  are	  multiple	  ways	  to	  experience	  each	  of	  these	  seven	  basic	  emotions	  (e.g.	  amusement,	  relief,	  excitement,	  wonder,	  and	  ecstasy	  all	  belong	  to	  the	  family	  of	  enjoyable	  emotions).	  There	  are	  also	  multiple	  muscular	  configurations	  for	  the	  accompanying	  facial	  expressions	  of	  each	  emotion,	  not	  just	  a	  single	  configuration	  (e.g.	  there	  are	  more	  than	  60	  different	  anger	  expressions;	  Ekman	  &	  Friesen,	  1975).	  The	  facial	  expressions	  in	  a	  family	  share	  certain	  configurational	  features,	  which	  differentiate	  them	  from	  the	  families	  of	  other	  expressions.	  This	  diversity	  could	  potentially	  serve	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  different	  contexts	  of	  emotional	  arousal	  (e.g.	  simulated	  anger	  versus	  controlled	  anger),	  as	  well	  as	  intensities	  (e.g.	  annoyance	  versus	  rage)	  (Ekman,	  1992).	  However,	  emotion	  can	  exist	  without	  expression	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Ekman,	  1999).	  In	  certain	  contexts	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  inhibit	  the	  appearance	  of	  our	  emotions	  (emotion	  without	  expression)	  and	  in	  other	  contexts	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  suggest	  we	  are	  experiencing	  an	  emotion	  when	  in	  fact	  we	  are	  not	  (expression	  without	  emotion).	  It	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  inhibit	  an	  emotion	  than	  to	  fabricate	  one,	  as	  emotions	  have	  a	  very	  fast	  onset,	  they	  can	  happen	  before	  the	  individual	  is	  aware	  that	  they	  have	  begun.	  This	  is	  an	  adaptive	  function	  that	  sometimes	  may	  work	  against	  us,	  yet	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  quickly	  mobilise	  when	  responding	  to	  important	  events	  (Ekman,	  1999).	  Therefore,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  set	  of	  instructions	  that	  reflect	  our	  own	  personal	  history	  and	  evolutionary	  adaptations,	  which	  guides	  our	  actions	  (Ekman	  &	  Cordaro,	  2011).	  Tomkins	  &	  McCarter	  (1964)	  proposed	  an	  inherited	  central	  mechanism	  they	  called	  an	  affect	  program,	  which	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directs	  emotional	  behaviour.	  Affect	  programs	  are	  sub-­‐cortical	  structures,	  which	  are	  able	  to	  control	  the	  rate	  and	  duration	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  muscles	  and	  glands	  in	  specific	  ways,	  which	  are	  characteristic	  of	  the	  emotion	  that	  is	  being	  experienced.	  	  
1.1. The	  development	  of	  interpreting	  and	  expressing	  emotion	  
	   Emotions	  are	  incredibly	  complex	  phenomena	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  when	  and	  how	  our	  ability	  to	  recognise	  and	  interpret	  emotional	  states	  in	  others	  develops,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  own	  ability	  to	  convey	  the	  emotions	  we	  feel	  (or	  wish	  others	  to	  think	  that	  we	  feel)	  via	  facial	  expressions.	  	  	  
1.1.1. Facial	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  
	   Our	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  manage	  interpersonal	  relationships	  relies	  primarily	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  infer	  the	  emotional	  states	  of	  others	  through	  both	  verbal	  and	  non-­‐verbal	  cues.	  Verbal	  cues	  can	  provide	  a	  simple	  and	  to	  the	  point	  description	  of	  how	  a	  person	  is	  feeling,	  often	  with	  little	  room	  for	  incorrect	  interpretation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  non-­‐verbal	  cues	  include	  body	  language	  and	  facial	  expressions	  such	  as	  ‘macroexpressions’,	  which	  are	  produced	  when	  emotions	  occur	  and	  typically	  last	  between	  0.5	  and	  4	  seconds	  (Ekman,	  2003).	  Non-­‐verbal	  cues	  can	  also	  be	  much	  more	  subtle	  than	  verbal	  cues.	  In	  fact,	  non-­‐verbal	  cues	  can	  be	  so	  subtle	  that	  the	  person	  displaying	  them	  can	  be	  completely	  unaware	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  so.	  These	  subtle	  ‘microexpressions’	  are	  “extremely	  quick	  facial	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  that	  appear	  on	  the	  face	  for	  less	  than	  ½	  a	  second”	  (Matsumoto	  &	  Hwang,	  2011,	  p.181).	  Unlike	  macroexpressions,	  microexpressions	  are	  likely	  signs	  of	  concealed	  or	  deceitful	  emotions,	  which	  occur	  when	  an	  individual	  is	  experiencing	  an	  intensely	  emotional	  situation	  but	  cannot	  afford	  to	  let	  others	  see	  how	  they	  are	  feeling.	  The	  ability	  to	  detect	  microexpressions	  in	  these	  situations	  will	  undoubtedly	  be	  beneficial	  in	  evaluating	  the	  truthfulness	  and	  intentions	  of	  the	  individual	  (Frank	  &	  Ekman,	  1997).	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  research	  before	  them,	  Paul	  Ekman	  and	  colleagues	  (e.g.	  Ekman	  &	  Friesen,	  1971;	  Ekman,	  Sorenson,	  &	  Friesen,	  1969;	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Izard,	  1971)	  found	  agreement	  across	  a	  dozen	  Western	  and	  non-­‐Western	  cultures	  (and	  in	  a	  subsequent	  study,	  a	  visually	  isolated	  pre-­‐literate	  culture	  in	  New	  Guinea)	  in	  correctly	  recognizing	  the	  emotions	  displayed	  in	  photographs	  of	  posed	  Caucasian	  facial	  expressions.	  These	  emotions	  were	  also	  recognizable	  to	  Westerners	  when	  displayed	  by	  the	  New	  Guineans	  (Ekman,	  Rolls,	  Perrett,	  &	  Ellis,	  1992).	  These	  results	  strongly	  opposed	  previous	  research	  that	  facial	  expressions	  are	  socially	  learned	  and	  culturally	  variable	  (e.g.	  Hunt,	  1941;	  Munn,	  1940).	  Further	  studies	  supported	  the	  notion	  of	  universal	  facial	  expressions	  using	  Japanese	  and	  American	  participants	  videotaped	  watching	  emotion-­‐inducing	  films.	  For	  example,	  a	  study	  by	  Ekman	  (1972)	  found	  no	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  cultures	  when	  the	  participants	  thought	  they	  were	  alone,	  yet	  when	  an	  authority	  figure	  was	  present,	  Japanese	  participants	  masked	  their	  negative	  expressions	  more	  than	  the	  Americans,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  positive	  expressions.	  This	  likely	  resulted	  in	  microexpressions	  of	  negative	  emotion	  being	  leaked	  by	  the	  Japanese	  participants,	  although	  this	  was	  not	  reported.	  	  
	  
1.1.2. Theory	  of	  mind	  
	  Theory	  of	  mind	  (ToM)	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  person	  to	  infer	  the	  emotional	  states	  of	  the	  self	  and	  others	  (Premack	  &	  Woodruff,	  1978).	  That	  is,	  an	  awareness	  that	  “…different	  individuals	  can	  have	  different	  thoughts”	  (Frith	  &	  Frith,	  2003,	  p.459).	  Evidence	  of	  ToM	  begins	  to	  emerge	  in	  stages	  from	  around	  6	  months	  of	  age,	  but	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  intentions	  is	  only	  found	  from	  around	  18	  months	  of	  age.	  From	  the	  age	  of	  three,	  children	  are	  able	  to	  refer	  to	  mental	  states	  using	  words	  ‘I	  thought’,’	  I	  know’	  (Shatz,	  Wellman,	  &	  Silber,	  1983),	  and	  from	  age	  five	  they	  can	  understand	  second-­‐order	  tasks,	  which	  involve	  the	  attribution	  of	  a	  belief	  about	  another	  individual’s	  belief	  (Sullivan,	  Zaitchik,	  &	  Tager-­‐Flusberg,	  1994).	  From	  age	  six	  they	  are	  able	  to	  predict	  behaviour	  based	  on	  false	  beliefs	  (Baron-­‐Cohen,	  Leslie,	  &	  Frith,	  1985).	  In	  social	  terms,	  these	  developments	  in	  ToM	  allow	  children	  to	  understand	  the	  behaviour	  of	  those	  around	  them	  better,	  leading	  to	  less	  conflict	  due	  to	  misunderstandings.	  However,	  it	  also	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  deceitful	  and	  manipulate	  social	  situations	  (Hughes	  &	  Leekam,	  2004).	  Deficits	  in	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  infer	  the	  mental	  states	  of	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others	  may	  lead	  to	  biased	  interpretations	  and	  cognitive	  distortions	  (Keenan	  &	  Ward,	  2000),	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  empathic	  process.	  
	  
1.1.3. Empathy	  
	  The	  ability	  to	  empathise	  with	  another	  person	  is	  a	  multi-­‐step	  process,	  and	  requires	  an	  individual	  to	  be	  adept	  at	  emotion	  recognition	  and	  perspective	  taking,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  able	  to	  experience	  the	  appropriate	  emotion	  towards	  the	  target	  and	  offer	  an	  appropriate	  behavioural	  response	  (Ward	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Barnett	  and	  Mann	  (2013,	  p.	  230)	  define	  empathy	  as	  “a	  cognitive	  emotional	  understanding	  of	  another	  person’s	  experience,	  resulting	  in	  an	  emotional	  response	  for	  the	  observer	  which	  is	  congruent	  with	  a	  view	  that	  others	  are	  worthy	  of	  compassion	  and	  respect	  and	  have	  intrinsic	  worth.”	  	  In	  its	  simplest	  form,	  empathy	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  two	  core	  components:	  cognitive	  empathy	  and	  affective	  empathy	  (W.	  L.	  Marshall	  &	  Maric,	  1996).	  The	  cognitive	  component	  involves	  identifying	  the	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  of	  another	  person,	  as	  well	  as	  taking	  their	  perspective,	  whereas	  the	  emotional	  component	  involves	  sharing	  the	  feelings	  of	  another	  person.	  Singer	  (2006)	  suggests	  that	  non-­‐overlapping	  neuro-­‐cognitive	  circuits	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  different	  abilities	  required	  for	  the	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  components	  of	  empathy.	  Additionally,	  the	  brain	  regions	  relevant	  to	  these	  components	  are	  thought	  to	  develop	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  life,	  with	  regions	  relevant	  to	  the	  affective	  component	  developing	  first	  (Singer,	  2006).	  More	  recent	  definitions	  suggest	  as	  many	  as	  five	  components,	  breaking	  down	  the	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  components	  into	  more	  specific	  parts.	  Barnett	  and	  Mann	  (2013)	  argue	  for	  a	  five	  component	  definition	  of	  empathy	  which	  includes	  emotion	  contagion,	  perspective-­‐taking,	  belief	  in	  others’	  intrinsic	  worth,	  the	  influence	  of	  situational	  factors,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  manage	  personal	  distress.	  These	  processes	  work	  together	  to	  produce	  an	  empathic	  response	  and	  a	  deficit	  in	  just	  one	  component	  can	  impair	  the	  response.	  For	  example,	  deficits	  in	  one’s	  ability	  to	  manage	  personal	  stress	  could	  impair	  or	  inhibit	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  utilise	  the	  first	  two	  components,	  as	  emotional	  contagion	  and	  perspective-­‐taking	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can	  produce	  distressing	  feelings	  that	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  effectively	  to	  enable	  an	  empathic	  experience	  (Barnett	  &	  Mann,	  2013).	  	  	  As	  noted	  previously,	  being	  able	  to	  recognise	  facial	  expressions	  displayed	  by	  others	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  empathic	  response.	  To	  examine	  this	  relationship	  more	  closely,	  Besel	  and	  Yuille	  (2010)	  conducted	  a	  study	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  university	  students.	  They	  had	  participants	  view	  facial	  expressions	  but	  varied	  the	  length	  of	  time	  the	  expression	  was	  visible.	  In	  one	  condition,	  participants	  saw	  images	  for	  only	  50ms	  before	  they	  had	  to	  choose	  which	  emotion	  was	  displayed,	  and	  in	  a	  second	  condition	  they	  had	  2,000ms.	  When	  facial	  expressions	  are	  presented	  for	  a	  brief	  time	  period	  such	  as	  50ms,	  rapid	  judgment	  is	  required	  and	  occurs	  unconsciously	  (Besel	  &	  Yuille,	  2010).	  Recognition	  accuracy	  was	  compared	  with	  scores	  on	  the	  Empathy	  Quotient	  (EQ;	  Lawrence,	  Shaw,	  Baker,	  Baron-­‐Cohen,	  &	  David,	  2004)	  and	  Empathic	  Concern	  subscale	  of	  the	  Interpersonal	  Reactivity	  Scale	  (IRS-­‐EC;	  Davis,	  1983).	  Results	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  50ms	  condition,	  high	  scores	  on	  the	  EQ	  were	  associated	  with	  higher	  recognition	  accuracy,	  however	  IRS-­‐EC	  scores	  were	  a	  better	  predictor	  of	  recognition	  accuracy	  (β	  =	  .19,	  p	  =	  .04).	  Interestingly,	  this	  pattern	  was	  reversed	  in	  the	  2000ms	  condition.	  This	  result	  is	  not	  surprising	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  empathy	  is	  largely	  an	  automatic	  process	  (Decety	  &	  Jackson,	  2006)	  and	  this	  theory	  would	  explain	  why	  participants	  who	  scored	  highly	  on	  measures	  of	  empathy	  were	  more	  accurate	  in	  the	  50ms	  condition	  (unconscious	  processing)	  but	  not	  in	  the	  2,000ms	  condition	  (conscious	  processing).	  
	  Facial	  expressions	  give	  us	  valuable	  information	  about	  how	  a	  person	  is	  feeling	  that	  can	  allow	  us	  to	  infer	  their	  emotional	  state	  and	  share	  in	  their	  emotional	  experience.	  Deficits	  in	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  create	  facial	  expressions	  may	  impair	  the	  ability	  of	  others	  to	  infer	  their	  emotional	  state	  and	  subsequently	  empathise	  with	  them.	  In	  addition,	  an	  inability	  to	  recognise	  accurately	  the	  facial	  expressions	  of	  others	  will	  impair	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  empathise	  with	  them.	  Occasionally,	  an	  individual	  may	  want	  to	  hide	  their	  expressions,	  and	  thus	  prevent	  others	  from	  knowing	  how	  they	  are	  feeling.	  
	   	  	   12	  
However,	  this	  may	  cause	  ‘leaks’	  in	  the	  form	  of	  microexpressions,	  which	  would	  allow	  others	  a	  glimpse	  at	  their	  emotional	  state.	  	  
1.2. Making	  the	  link	  between	  facial	  expressions	  and	  emotional	  states	  
	   We	  develop	  the	  ability	  to	  relate	  facial	  expressions	  to	  distinct	  emotional	  states	  around	  2-­‐3	  years	  of	  age,	  although	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  disgust,	  surprise,	  and	  fear	  generally	  takes	  longer	  to	  develop	  than	  for	  happiness	  and	  sadness	  (Gosselin	  &	  Simard,	  1999).	  This	  is	  due	  to	  errors	  that	  are	  commonly	  made	  by	  children	  in	  the	  early	  recognition	  of	  these	  emotions:	  disgust	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  anger,	  surprise	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  happiness,	  and	  fear	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  surprise	  (Gosselin,	  1995).	  Despite	  these	  errors,	  children	  are	  able	  to	  recognise	  facial	  affect	  at	  above	  chance	  levels.	  However,	  they	  are	  substantially	  less	  accurate	  than	  adults	  and	  likely	  do	  not	  acquire	  full	  recognition	  proficiency	  before	  10	  years	  of	  age	  (Durand,	  Gallay,	  Seigneuric,	  Robichon,	  &	  Baudouin,	  2007).	  Durand	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  tested	  children	  in	  four	  different	  age	  groups	  (ages	  5-­‐6,	  7-­‐8,	  9-­‐10,	  11-­‐12)	  and	  adults	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  recognise	  and	  discriminate	  between	  facial	  expressions.	  They	  used	  both	  whole	  (upright	  and	  inverted)	  and	  composite	  faces	  expressing	  various	  emotions.	  The	  composite	  faces	  were	  made	  by	  cutting	  each	  photo	  horizontally	  through	  the	  bridge	  of	  the	  nose,	  and	  then	  pairing	  each	  top-­‐half	  with	  a	  bottom-­‐half	  expressing	  a	  different	  emotion	  but	  posed	  by	  the	  same	  person.	  Results	  showed	  that	  children	  were	  able	  to	  recognise	  happiness	  and	  sadness	  at	  near	  adult	  levels	  around	  5-­‐6	  years	  of	  age,	  fear	  at	  7	  years,	  anger	  at	  9	  years,	  and	  disgust	  at	  12	  years	  of	  age.	  However,	  in	  virtually	  all	  cases,	  children’s	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  improved	  consistently	  from	  5-­‐6	  years	  to	  adulthood.	  	  Interestingly,	  it	  seems	  that	  young	  children	  have	  trouble	  in	  distinguishing	  neutral	  facial	  affect.	  While	  adults	  tend	  to	  categorise	  ambiguous	  emotions	  as	  either	  happiness	  or	  neutrality,	  children	  are	  not	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  unclear	  boundaries	  of	  neutrality	  and	  so	  categorise	  ambiguous	  emotions	  as	  either	  happiness,	  or	  sadness	  (Durand	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  It	  was	  believed	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  adults	  relying	  on	  configural	  processing	  (e.g.	  using	  the	  relative	  position	  of,	  and	  the	  distance	  between,	  features)	  to	  process	  facial	  stimuli,	  whereas	  children	  under	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10	  years	  of	  age	  were	  thought	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  local	  information	  such	  as	  features	  and	  paraphernalia	  (Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1977).	  However,	  the	  results	  of	  Durand	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  suggest	  that	  children	  under	  10	  years	  of	  age	  are	  in	  fact	  able	  to	  use	  configural	  information	  to	  process	  facial	  emotion	  in	  a	  holistic	  way,	  as	  children	  also	  showed	  both	  an	  inversion	  effect	  (the	  impairment	  of	  recognition	  due	  to	  a	  face	  being	  upside	  down)	  and	  a	  composite	  effect	  (the	  impairment	  of	  recognition	  due	  to	  a	  face	  being	  made	  up	  of	  the	  top	  half	  of	  one	  face	  and	  the	  bottom	  half	  of	  a	  different	  face).	  These	  two	  effects	  are	  known	  to	  interfere	  with	  configural	  processing	  (Durand	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  	  
1.3. Impairments	  to	  Recognition	  Accuracy	  
	  
	   Although	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  facial	  expressions	  naturally	  varies	  from	  person	  to	  person,	  there	  are	  several	  identified	  phenomena	  that	  can	  impair	  an	  otherwise	  healthy	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  read	  the	  emotions	  of	  others	  (e.g.	  brain	  damage,	  aging,	  trauma),	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  	  
	  
1.3.1.	  Effects	  of	  damage	  to	  the	  brain	  on	  emotion	  recognition	  	  Damage	  to	  the	  brain	  can	  impede	  our	  ability	  to	  detect	  facial	  affect	  on	  the	  faces	  of	  others.	  Adolphs,	  Tranel,	  Damasio,	  and	  Damasio	  (1995)	  suggest	  that	  although	  bilateral	  damage	  to	  the	  amygdala	  generally	  causes	  impairment	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  fearful	  facial	  expressions,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  affect	  recognition	  of	  the	  other	  emotions.	  In	  addition,	  the	  ability	  to	  draw	  expressions	  of	  fear	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  compromised,	  although	  this	  pattern	  did	  not	  emerge	  for	  participants	  with	  unilateral	  amygdala	  damage.	  However,	  a	  study	  by	  Calder	  (1996)	  suggests	  that	  recognition	  of	  other	  emotions	  (particularly	  anger)	  can	  also	  be	  impaired	  by	  damage	  to	  the	  amygdala,	  although	  impairments	  in	  detecting	  fear	  were	  still	  the	  most	  severe.	  Despite	  this	  discrepancy,	  the	  two	  studies	  did	  have	  one	  finding	  in	  common,	  the	  ability	  to	  infer	  emotion	  from	  facial	  expressions	  seems	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  facial	  identity.	  However,	  both	  studies	  had	  only	  one	  or	  two	  participants	  with	  bilateral	  damage	  (plus	  a	  handful	  of	  controls),	  and	  each	  used	  different	  experimental	  methods,	  thus	  making	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generalisations	  from,	  and	  comparisons	  between,	  the	  two	  studies	  difficult.	  Adolphs	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  set	  out	  to	  resolve	  these	  limitations	  by	  testing	  a	  group	  of	  nine	  individuals	  (most	  of	  whom	  had	  participated	  in	  previous	  studies)	  with	  bilateral	  damage	  on	  a	  single	  standardised	  task.	  The	  larger	  sample	  size	  allowed	  for	  statistical	  analyses	  to	  be	  performed,	  and	  these	  tests	  showed	  that	  participants	  with	  bilateral	  amygdala	  damage	  were	  the	  most	  impaired	  in	  their	  recognition	  of	  fear	  and	  anger,	  relative	  to	  brain-­‐damaged	  and	  normal	  controls,	  supporting	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  studies	  (Adolphs	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Calder,	  1996).	  Adolphs	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  argued	  that	  these	  results	  and	  the	  results	  of	  previous	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  human	  amygdala	  is	  involved	  not	  just	  in	  the	  processing	  of	  fearful	  stimuli,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  specialised	  neural	  system	  involved	  in	  triggering	  physiological	  states	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  threatening	  or	  dangerous	  stimuli.	  	  
1.3.2.	  Effects	  of	  aging	  on	  emotion	  recognition	  	  The	  natural	  process	  of	  aging	  can	  also	  have	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  accurately	  identify	  the	  emotional	  states	  of	  others.	  Calder	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  employed	  two	  different	  experimental	  designs.	  In	  a	  first	  experiment,	  they	  had	  participants	  label	  faces	  with	  one	  of	  six	  emotions,	  and	  in	  a	  second	  experiment	  they	  had	  participants	  label	  faces	  morphed	  between	  two	  different	  emotions	  for	  six	  different	  emotion	  pairs	  (e.g.	  90%	  happiness-­‐10%	  surprise;	  the	  other	  ratios	  used	  were	  70-­‐30,	  50-­‐50,	  30-­‐70,	  and	  10-­‐90).	  Over	  the	  two	  experiments	  they	  found	  that	  with	  increasing	  age,	  participants'	  recognition	  of	  expressions	  of	  fear	  became	  significantly	  less	  accurate.	  Recognition	  of	  sadness	  and	  anger	  also	  showed	  a	  decline	  across	  age	  groups.	  However,	  recognition	  of	  disgust	  actually	  improved	  with	  increasing	  age,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  more	  pronounced	  with	  the	  morphed	  faces.	  Calder	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  suggested	  that	  the	  decrease	  in	  recognition	  of	  fear	  was	  unlikely	  to	  be	  due	  to	  an	  impairment	  in	  recognising	  more	  difficult	  emotions	  as	  this	  would	  also	  affect	  the	  recognition	  of	  disgust.	  Univariate	  ANOVAs	  that	  compared	  accuracy	  for	  all	  emotions	  across	  the	  five	  age	  groups	  revealed	  no	  significant	  decline	  in	  accuracy	  with	  age	  for	  the	  other	  emotions,	  supporting	  this	  conclusion.	  Kessels,	  Montagne,	  Hendriks,	  Perrett,	  and	  Haan	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(2014)	  also	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  decline	  in	  emotion	  recognition	  over	  the	  life	  span.	  Using	  a	  dynamic	  morphing	  procedure,	  where	  participants	  were	  shown	  neutral	  faces	  that	  gradually	  morphed	  into	  a	  random	  intensity	  (40,	  60,	  80,	  and	  100%)	  of	  a	  given	  emotion,	  they	  tested	  participants	  ranging	  from	  8-­‐75	  years	  of	  age.	  Specifically,	  they	  found	  that	  recognition	  of	  anger,	  fear,	  sadness,	  and	  happiness	  was	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  age,	  with	  accuracy	  for	  all	  emotions	  peaking	  at	  26-­‐35	  years	  of	  age	  and	  then	  declining	  slowly	  from	  ages	  36-­‐75.	  	  These	  studies	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  15	  published	  studies	  carried	  out	  by	  Ruffman,	  Henry,	  Livingstone,	  and	  Phillips	  (2008).	  In	  all,	  there	  were	  28	  data	  sets	  gathered	  between	  1995	  and	  2008,	  containing	  1,667	  participants.	  In	  their	  analysis,	  they	  found	  older	  adults	  (mean	  age	  70.2	  years)	  were	  significantly	  less	  accurate	  than	  younger	  adults	  (mean	  age	  23.9	  years)	  at	  recognising	  expressions	  of	  anger,	  sadness,	  and	  fear	  (mean	  d	  =	  .34,	  .34,	  and	  .27	  respectively),	  as	  well	  as	  happiness	  and	  surprise	  although	  these	  differences	  were	  much	  smaller	  (d	  =	  .08,	  and	  .07	  respectively).	  In	  contrast,	  Boshyan,	  Zebrowitz,	  Franklin,	  McCormick,	  and	  Carré	  (2013)	  investigated	  age	  similarities	  in	  recognizing	  threat	  from	  faces	  and	  diagnostic	  cues.	  The	  participants	  were	  divided	  randomly	  into	  three	  conditions:	  experimental,	  distraction,	  and	  accuracy.	  In	  the	  experimental	  condition,	  participants	  were	  told	  to	  rate	  a	  series	  of	  faces	  based	  only	  on	  their	  first	  impressions	  and	  not	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  accuracy.	  In	  the	  distraction	  condition,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  as	  per	  the	  experimental	  condition.	  However,	  a	  random	  three-­‐digit	  number	  would	  appear	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  1s	  prior	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  each	  face.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  count	  backward	  out	  loud	  from	  that	  number	  by	  three	  while	  they	  viewed	  the	  face	  and	  to	  stop	  counting	  when	  the	  rating	  scale	  appeared.	  In	  the	  accuracy	  condition,	  participants	  were	  given	  much	  more	  information	  about	  the	  experimental	  design	  and	  told:	  “As	  you	  are	  rating	  these	  men,	  please	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  they	  actually	  do	  vary	  in	  how	  aggressive	  they	  were	  when	  provoked,	  and	  judge	  as	  accurately	  as	  you	  can”	  (Boshyan	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  p.2-­‐3).	  Analyses	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  (participant	  age,	  condition)	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  age	  and	  condition	  was	  also	  not	  significant.	  Planned	  comparisons	  also	  revealed	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  age	  groups	  within	  each	  condition.	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Ebner	  and	  Johnson	  (2009)	  examined	  whether	  age-­‐related	  deficits	  in	  emotion	  recognition	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  age	  of	  the	  face	  expressing	  the	  emotion.	  They	  tested	  university	  students	  (mean	  age	  19.3	  years)	  and	  older	  adults	  from	  the	  community	  (mean	  age	  74.8	  years)	  using	  two	  tasks.	  In	  the	  first	  task,	  participants	  were	  shown	  faces	  expressing	  happiness,	  anger,	  or	  no	  emotion	  (neutral).	  Faces	  were	  displayed	  for	  5s	  each	  and	  participants	  were	  only	  required	  to	  respond	  as	  to	  which	  emotion	  they	  had	  seen	  from	  four	  options:	  happiness,	  anger,	  neutral	  or	  other.	  The	  faces	  used	  in	  the	  task	  came	  from	  the	  FACES	  database	  (Ebner,	  Riediger,	  &	  Lindenberger,	  2010)	  and	  belonged	  to	  one	  of	  two	  age	  groups	  (18-­‐31	  years	  and	  69-­‐80	  years).	  In	  a	  second	  task,	  participants	  were	  shown	  the	  same	  faces	  (as	  well	  as	  24	  new	  faces)	  and	  had	  to	  say	  whether	  or	  not	  each	  face	  had	  been	  displayed	  in	  the	  previous	  task,	  and	  how	  certain	  they	  were	  of	  their	  decision	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1	  (not	  certain	  at	  all)	  to	  4	  (very	  certain).	  Consistent	  with	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  studies	  (Calder	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Kessels	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Ruffman	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  older	  adults	  (OA)	  were	  poorer	  at	  recognising	  angry	  faces	  than	  younger	  adults	  (YA),	  but	  the	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  their	  recognition	  of	  happy	  and	  neutral	  faces.	  However,	  this	  may	  partly	  be	  due	  to	  low	  participant	  numbers	  and	  therefore	  low	  statistical	  power.	  In	  addition,	  both	  OA	  and	  YA	  were	  more	  accurate	  in	  recognising	  emotion	  in	  young	  faces	  than	  older	  faces.	  However,	  this	  may	  well	  be	  due	  to	  the	  physical	  changes	  associated	  with	  aging	  (e.g.	  wrinkles)	  which	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  detect	  the	  subtle	  muscle	  movements	  necessary	  to	  identify	  an	  emotional	  expression	  (Ebner	  &	  Johnson,	  2009).	  Finally,	  YA	  performed	  significantly	  better	  on	  the	  memory	  task,	  showing	  higher	  accuracy	  overall	  and	  no	  differences	  due	  to	  emotion.	  In	  contrast,	  OA	  were	  significantly	  poorer	  at	  remembering	  angry	  faces	  than	  they	  were	  at	  remembering	  happy	  faces.	  This	  result	  in	  particular	  points	  towards	  a	  positive	  emotion	  bias	  in	  OA	  and	  this	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  separate	  section.	  Overall,	  research	  suggests	  a	  steady	  decline	  in	  emotion	  recognition	  accuracy	  over	  the	  lifespan;	  OA	  frequently	  perform	  poorer	  on	  recognition	  tasks	  than	  YA,	  especially	  when	  identifying	  expressions	  of	  anger	  and	  fear.	  In	  addition,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  emotions	  are	  easier	  to	  recognise	  in	  younger	  faces	  than	  older	  faces.	  The	  present	  study	  will	  take	  this	  one	  step	  further	  than	  Ebner	  and	  Johnson	  (2009)	  by	  using	  photos	  of	  children	  displaying	  emotions	  as	  well	  as	  adults.	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1.3.3.	  Effects	  of	  childhood	  trauma	  on	  emotion	  recognition	  	  Finally,	  traumatic	  experiences	  during	  childhood	  can	  alter	  the	  way	  we	  interpret	  and	  understand	  emotional	  stimuli.	  Pollak,	  Cicchetti,	  Hornung,	  and	  Reed	  (2000)	  tested	  three	  groups	  of	  children	  (neglected,	  physically	  abused,	  and	  a	  control	  group)	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  identify	  and	  discriminate	  between	  emotions.	  The	  children	  were	  individually	  presented	  with	  brief	  evocative	  accounts	  in	  which	  a	  protagonist	  experienced	  either	  happiness,	  fear,	  sadness,	  disgust,	  or	  anger.	  Following	  this,	  the	  children	  were	  shown	  three	  black	  and	  white	  photographs	  of	  models	  (of	  the	  same	  sex	  as	  the	  child)	  each	  expressing	  a	  different	  emotion	  and	  were	  asked	  which	  face	  was	  expressing	  the	  same	  emotion	  as	  the	  protagonist	  in	  the	  story.	  Pollak	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  found	  that	  control	  children	  performed	  significantly	  better	  on	  the	  task	  than	  both	  abused	  and	  neglected	  children	  (accuracy	  scores	  of	  66%,	  59%,	  and	  51%	  respectively).	  Post-­‐hoc	  analyses	  of	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  maltreatment	  group	  and	  emotion	  revealed	  that	  the	  accuracy	  scores	  were	  significant	  for	  anger	  and	  sadness.	  For	  angry	  expressions,	  neglected	  children’s	  recognition	  accuracy	  was	  significantly	  lower	  than	  both	  physically	  abused	  and	  control	  children.	  For	  sad	  expressions,	  physically	  abused	  children	  performed	  significantly	  worse	  than	  controls,	  but	  not	  neglected	  children.	  In	  addition,	  both	  control	  and	  physically	  abused	  children	  were	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  more	  accurately	  than	  neglected	  children.	  Neglected	  children	  also	  showed	  a	  liberal	  response	  bias	  for	  sad	  faces,	  which	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  considering	  their	  below	  chance	  accuracy	  for	  correctly	  recognising	  this	  emotion	  (accuracy	  <40%).	  Physically	  abused	  children	  also	  showed	  a	  liberal	  response	  bias,	  although	  this	  was	  towards	  angry	  faces,	  and	  this	  was	  reflected	  in	  their	  high	  recognition	  accuracy	  for	  this	  emotion	  (accuracy	  >70%).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  biases	  arise	  from	  the	  emotions	  that	  neglected	  and	  abused	  children	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  experienced	  frequently	  due	  to	  their	  adverse	  circumstances.	  Shenk,	  Putnam,	  and	  Noll	  (2013)	  found	  that	  in	  female	  adolescents,	  maltreatment	  (in	  this	  case	  mainly	  physical	  and	  sexual	  abuse)	  interacted	  with	  level	  of	  intellectual	  functioning	  to	  predict	  recognition	  accuracy.	  Whereas	  maltreated	  females	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  intellectual	  functioning	  were	  the	  least	  accurate,	  maltreated	  females	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  intellectual	  functioning	  performed	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐maltreated	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females.	  However,	  maltreated	  females	  were	  significantly	  less	  accurate	  at	  recognising	  fear	  than	  non-­‐maltreated	  females.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  an	  interaction	  between	  childhood	  trauma	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  and	  interpret	  emotional	  stimuli.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  to	  consider	  when	  examining	  emotion	  recognition	  abilities,	  as	  deficits	  in	  recognition	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  traumatic	  events	  in	  the	  individual’s	  past.	  	  
1.4.	  Biases	  in	  Emotion	  Recognition	  	  	  Research	  has	  also	  provided	  evidence	  that	  older	  adults	  (OA)	  tend	  to	  show	  a	  positivity	  bias	  (i.e.	  they	  label	  negative	  emotions	  as	  positive)	  towards	  negative	  stimuli	  (Mather	  &	  Carstensen,	  2005)	  compared	  with	  younger	  adults	  (YA),	  although	  this	  is	  a	  small	  effect	  (Murphy	  &	  Isaacowitz,	  2008).	  A	  study	  by	  Ruffman,	  Sullivan,	  and	  Edge	  (2006)	  found	  that	  OA	  and	  YA	  differed	  in	  how	  they	  discriminated	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐danger	  faces;	  interestingly,	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  present	  when	  rating	  situations	  instead	  of	  faces.	  More	  specifically,	  OA	  rated	  high-­‐danger	  faces	  as	  less	  of	  a	  threat	  than	  YA	  did,	  although	  the	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ	  when	  rating	  low-­‐danger	  faces.	  Zebrowitz,	  Franklin	  Jr,	  Hillman,	  and	  Boc	  (2013)	  also	  found	  evidence	  for	  a	  positivity	  bias	  in	  OA.	  In	  their	  study,	  OA	  and	  YA	  rated	  a	  set	  of	  faces	  on	  four	  traits	  (competent,	  healthy,	  untrustworthy,	  and	  aggressive	  or	  hostile).	  They	  found	  that	  OA	  trait	  impressions	  of	  health,	  untrustworthiness,	  and	  hostility	  showed	  greater	  positivity	  than	  those	  of	  YA.	  In	  addition,	  these	  differences	  were	  far	  more	  pronounced	  for	  more	  negative	  looking	  faces,	  with	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  for	  the	  less	  negative	  faces	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  untrustworthy	  and	  hostile	  traits.	  Finally,	  Kellough	  and	  Knight	  (2012)	  used	  a	  morphing	  procedure	  (i.e.	  morphing	  two	  faces	  together	  to	  create	  a	  continuum	  from	  one	  emotion	  to	  the	  other)	  and	  found	  that	  OA	  positivity	  effects	  were	  dependent	  on	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  expressions	  presented	  to	  them.	  Specifically,	  OA	  perceived	  both	  negative	  and	  ambiguous	  expressions	  to	  be	  more	  positive	  than	  YA,	  and	  in	  addition,	  OA	  perceived	  negative	  emotions	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  YA	  (that	  is,	  OA	  saw	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  emotions	  in	  these	  faces).	  Interestingly,	  manipulating	  older	  adults’	  time	  perspective	  effectively	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reduced	  the	  positivity	  effects	  discussed	  above.	  This	  was	  done	  by	  giving	  OA	  the	  following	  instructions	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  procedure:	  “Imagine	  that	  last	  week	  you	  found	  out	  from	  your	  doctor	  about	  a	  new	  medical	  advance	  that	  insures	  you	  will	  enjoy	  20	  more	  years	  beyond	  the	  age	  you	  expected	  to	  live,	  in	  reasonably	  good	  health”	  (Kellough	  &	  Knight,	  2012,	  p.153).	  An	  expanded	  time	  perspective	  may	  allow	  OA	  to	  more	  fully	  process	  negative	  affect	  and	  focus	  less	  on	  maintaining	  a	  positive	  mood.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  studies,	  Ruffman	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  did	  not	  find	  evidence	  for	  a	  positivity	  bias	  in	  OA	  in	  their	  meta-­‐analysis.	  In	  fact,	  they	  found	  that	  OA	  were	  less	  accurate	  than	  YA	  when	  labeling	  expressions	  of	  happiness,	  and	  more	  accurate	  than	  YA	  when	  labeling	  expressions	  of	  disgust.	  Both	  of	  these	  findings	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  a	  positivity	  bias	  in	  OA.	  	  Regardless,	  if	  OA	  are	  indeed	  more	  likely	  to	  show	  a	  bias	  towards	  positive	  emotions,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  older	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  will	  be	  even	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  doing	  so,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  to	  incorrectly	  interpret	  negative	  facial	  expressions	  as	  sexual	  advances	  or	  pleasure,	  or	  to	  ignore	  them	  completely	  (Ward,	  Hudson,	  Johnston,	  &	  Marshall,	  1997).	  This	  process	  of	  selective	  attention	  allows	  the	  offender	  to	  justify	  his	  actions	  as	  pleasurable	  for	  the	  victim,	  as	  he	  has	  no	  information	  that	  would	  suggest	  otherwise.	  This	  could	  result	  in	  negative	  outcomes	  for	  older	  released	  offenders	  due	  partly	  to	  poor	  emotion	  recognition,	  which	  is	  something	  that	  can	  be	  improved	  with	  training.	  	  
1.5.	  Child	  sexual	  offenders	  and	  emotion	  recognition	  	  Child	  sexual	  offenders	  are	  an	  important	  group	  for	  research	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  their	  offending	  has	  on	  their	  victims	  and	  society	  at	  large.	  However,	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  emotion	  recognition	  abilities	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  is	  currently	  not	  as	  extensive	  as	  other	  areas	  of	  sexual	  offender	  research,	  and	  thus	  requires	  more	  investigation.	  
	  
1.5.1.	  Deficits	  in	  theory	  of	  mind	  and	  cognitive	  distortions	  
	   	  Distorted	  thinking	  about	  their	  victims	  and	  potential	  victims	  plays	  a	  large	  part	  in	  the	  origin	  and	  maintaining	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders’	  abusive	  behaviour.	  
	   	  	   20	  
In	  addition,	  many	  offenders	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  distress	  their	  victims	  experience,	  as	  well	  as	  lacking	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  form	  and	  manage	  intimate	  and	  interpersonal	  relationships	  with	  adults	  (Keenan	  &	  Ward,	  2000).	  Ward	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  suggest	  that	  deficits	  in	  an	  offender’s	  ability	  to	  infer	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  others	  (or	  their	  theory	  of	  mind)	  may	  contribute	  to	  these	  deficits	  in	  empathy	  and	  intimacy,	  as	  well	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  cognitive	  distortions.	  They	  also	  suggest	  that	  theory	  of	  mind	  deficits	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  common	  amongst	  sexual	  offenders.	  	  	   Castellino,	  Bosco,	  Marshall,	  Marshall,	  and	  Veglia	  (2011)	  tested	  both	  sexual	  offenders	  (child	  molesters	  and	  rapists)	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  complete	  first-­‐order,	  second-­‐order,	  and	  advanced	  theory	  of	  mind	  (ToM)	  tasks.	  First-­‐order	  ToM	  tasks	  involve	  attributing	  a	  false	  belief	  about	  the	  identity	  or	  location	  of	  an	  object	  to	  another	  individual.	  Second-­‐order	  ToM	  tasks	  involve	  attributing	  an	  individual’s	  false	  belief	  about	  another	  individual’s	  belief.	  Advanced	  ToM	  tasks	  involve	  attribution	  of	  mental	  states	  such	  as	  desires,	  beliefs	  or	  intentions,	  and	  sometimes	  one	  character’s	  belief	  about	  what	  another	  character	  knows.	  Castellino	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  found	  that	  while	  sexual	  offenders	  performed	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐offenders	  on	  first	  order	  ToM	  tasks,	  they	  performed	  worse	  on	  second-­‐order	  and	  advanced	  ToM	  tasks,	  and	  a	  Theory	  of	  Mind	  Assessment	  Scale	  (Th.o.m.a.s;	  Bosco	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Th.o.m.a.s	  consists	  of	  four	  subscales:	  I-­‐Me	  (awareness	  of	  my	  own	  mental	  states),	  Other-­‐Self	  (awareness	  that	  other	  people	  can	  reflect	  on	  their	  own	  mental	  states),	  I-­‐Other	  (awareness	  that	  I	  can	  reflect	  on	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  others),	  and	  Other-­‐Me	  (awareness	  that	  other	  people	  form	  ideas	  about	  my	  own	  mental	  states).	  The	  sexual	  offenders	  performed	  worse	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  on	  each	  of	  the	  Th.o.m.a.s	  subscales.	  In	  particular	  the	  offenders	  performed	  worse	  on	  the	  Other-­‐Self	  scale	  than	  the	  I-­‐Me	  and	  I-­‐Other	  scales	  (non-­‐offenders	  performed	  equally	  well	  on	  all	  three	  scales).	  This	  suggests	  the	  offenders	  found	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  make	  third-­‐person	  judgments	  about	  mental	  states	  than	  first-­‐person	  judgments,	  and	  that	  they	  found	  it	  even	  harder	  to	  do	  so	  from	  an	  allocentric	  perspective	  (other	  focused)	  than	  an	  egocentric	  perspective	  (I	  focused).	  Intelligence	  (IQ)	  was	  not	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  total	  scores	  on	  either	  the	  classical	  ToM	  tasks	  (first-­‐order,	  second-­‐order,	  and	  advanced)	  or	  the	  Th.o.m.a.s.	  Elsegood	  and	  Duff	  (2010)	  also	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found	  deficits	  in	  sexual	  offenders’	  ToM	  skills	  using	  the	  Reading	  the	  Mind	  in	  the	  Eyes	  test	  (RME;	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  et	  al.,	  2001),	  with	  both	  adult	  and	  child	  faces.	  The	  RME	  requires	  participants	  to	  make	  judgments	  about	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  others,	  based	  solely	  on	  a	  photograph	  of	  their	  eyes.	  Elsegood	  and	  Duff	  (2010)	  found	  that	  overall,	  sexual	  offenders	  performed	  worse	  on	  both	  the	  adult	  and	  child	  tasks	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  although	  only	  the	  difference	  in	  adult	  task	  scores	  was	  significant.	  On	  the	  adult	  task,	  15.2%	  of	  offenders	  scored	  more	  than	  two	  standard	  deviations	  (SD)	  below	  the	  normative	  mean	  (M	  =	  26),	  compared	  with	  4.3%	  of	  non-­‐offenders.	  On	  the	  child	  task,	  6.5%	  of	  offenders	  scored	  more	  than	  two	  SDs	  below	  the	  normative	  mean	  (M	  =	  19),	  compared	  with	  2.2%	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  [a	  score	  more	  than	  two	  SDs	  below	  the	  normative	  mean	  suggests	  a	  clear	  impairment	  on	  the	  task	  (Elsegood	  &	  Duff,	  2010)].	  Offenders’	  scores	  on	  the	  adult	  task	  were	  also	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  their	  scores	  on	  the	  child	  task	  (r	  =	  .46,	  p	  <	  .01);	  interestingly,	  this	  relationship	  was	  not	  found	  with	  non-­‐offenders.	  	  	   Cognitive	  distortions	  include	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  that	  are	  maladaptive,	  as	  well	  as	  problematic	  thinking	  styles	  (Ward,	  2000),	  although	  Ward	  and	  Casey	  (2010)	  suggest	  that	  the	  term	  “incorrect	  or	  deviant	  cognitive	  practices”	  should	  be	  used	  in	  its	  place.	  Abel	  and	  colleagues	  (Abel,	  Becker,	  &	  Cunningham-­‐Rathner,	  1984;	  Abel	  et	  al.,	  1989)	  argued	  that	  cognitive	  distortions	  arise	  from	  a	  conflict	  between	  their	  perception	  of	  social	  norms	  and	  their	  sexual	  preferences.	  The	  offenders	  then	  maintain	  their	  offending	  through	  these	  distorted	  beliefs	  that	  serve	  to	  legitimise	  their	  sexual	  contact	  with	  children.	  Ward	  and	  Casey	  (2010)	  propose	  that	  the	  extended	  mind	  theory	  (EMT)	  provides	  a	  superior	  explanation	  of	  sexual	  offenders	  use	  of	  cognitive	  distortions.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  EMT,	  cognitive	  distortions	  are	  dynamic,	  dependent	  on	  context,	  and	  include	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  components.	  The	  key	  idea	  of	  EMT	  suggests	  that	  the	  skin	  of	  the	  individual	  does	  not	  limit	  the	  mind,	  or	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  it	  is	  composed	  of.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  our	  cognitive	  systems	  are	  capable	  of	  reaching	  beyond	  our	  own	  self,	  into	  our	  social	  and	  physical	  environments	  (Wilson	  &	  Clark,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  a	  note	  written	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  paper	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  individual’s	  cognitive	  system	  (O	  ́	  Ciardha	  &	  Ward,	  2013).	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1.5.2.	  Empathy	  and	  emotion	  recognition	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  sex	  offenders	  may	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  empathise	  with	  their	  victims,	  although	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  empathise	  with	  people	  in	  general	  (William	  L.	  Marshall,	  Marshall,	  Serran,	  &	  O'Brien,	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  can	  also	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  an	  individual's	  ability	  to	  empathise	  with	  others	  (William	  L.	  Marshall	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Proeve	  &	  Howells,	  2002),	  and	  self-­‐esteem	  may	  be	  highly	  correlated	  with	  both	  of	  these	  (Sparks,	  Bailey,	  Marshall,	  &	  Marshall,	  2003).	  In	  particular,	  Sparks	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  found	  that	  self-­‐esteem	  was	  significantly	  related	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  offenders’	  to	  externalise	  blame	  and	  minimise	  aspects	  of	  their	  crimes.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  empathy	  in	  sexual	  offenders	  may	  be	  due	  to	  low	  self-­‐esteem,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  produce	  feelings	  of	  shame	  (William	  L.	  Marshall	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Barnett	  and	  Mann	  (2013)	  suggest	  that	  each	  of	  their	  five	  components	  of	  empathy	  can	  be	  disrupted	  by	  certain	  dynamic	  risk	  factors	  for	  sexual	  offending,	  thus	  impairing	  an	  offenders’	  ability	  to	  produce	  an	  empathic	  response	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  offence.	  These	  risk	  factors	  include:	  offence	  supportive	  beliefs,	  grievance/hostility,	  a	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	  others,	  self-­‐regulation	  problems,	  sexual	  preoccupation,	  and	  poor	  problem	  solving.	  Barnett	  and	  Mann	  (2013)	  also	  suggested	  that	  addressing	  these	  dynamic	  risk	  factors	  by	  focusing	  on	  increasing	  empathy	  for	  past	  victims	  may	  not	  affect	  an	  offenders’	  ability	  to	  empathise	  with	  potential	  victims	  in	  the	  future.	  Thus,	  treatment	  programmes	  should	  focus	  on	  general	  applications	  of	  the	  five	  components	  of	  empathy	  and	  not	  just	  particular	  past	  victims.	  	  	  Gery	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  compared	  recognition	  accuracy	  to	  scores	  on	  several	  self-­‐report	  measures	  of	  empathy	  for	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders.	  They	  found	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  scored	  significantly	  higher	  on	  all	  these	  measures	  than	  offenders	  (sex	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐sex	  offenders	  combined).	  In	  addition,	  Sex	  offenders	  scored	  significantly	  lower	  than	  non-­‐sex	  offenders	  and	  controls	  on	  the	  Empathy	  subscale	  of	  the	  Impulsivity-­‐Venturesomeness-­‐Empathy-­‐7	  questionnaire	  (ES-­‐IVE-­‐7;	  Eysenck,	  Pearson,	  Easting,	  &	  Allsopp,	  1985),	  whereas	  non-­‐sex	  offenders	  did	  not	  differ	  from	  controls.	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  also	  found	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that	  non-­‐offenders	  scored	  significantly	  higher	  on	  the	  Interpersonal	  Reactivity	  Index	  (IRI)	  than	  child	  sexual	  offenders.	  There	  were	  also	  significant	  positive	  partial	  correlations	  (pr)	  between	  scores	  on	  the	  ES-­‐IVE	  and	  recognition	  accuracy	  for	  fear	  (pr	  =	  .45)	  and	  disgust	  (pr	  =	  .56).	  No	  significant	  correlations	  were	  found	  between	  emotion	  recognition	  and	  the	  Fantasy	  (FS),	  Empathic	  Concern	  (EC),	  or	  Perspective	  Taking	  (PT)	  subscales	  of	  the	  Interpersonal	  Reactivity	  Index	  (IRI).	  However,	  significant	  negative	  correlations	  were	  found	  between	  the	  Personal	  Distress	  (PD)	  subscale	  of	  the	  IRI	  and	  surprise	  (pr	  =	  -­‐.43),	  and	  anger	  (pr	  =	  -­‐.48).	  In	  contrast,	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  found	  that	  accuracy	  of	  emotion	  recognition	  with	  child	  stimuli	  was	  significantly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  FS	  (r	  =	  .62),	  EC	  (r	  =	  .64),	  and	  PT	  (r	  =	  .49)	  subsacles	  of	  the	  IRI,	  but	  not	  the	  PD	  subscale.	  Participants	  who	  scored	  higher	  on	  measures	  of	  empathy	  were	  more	  accurate	  at	  recognising	  emotions	  in	  children,	  but	  this	  effect	  was	  not	  observed	  with	  adult	  stimuli	  in	  either	  study.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  offenders	  are	  less	  empathic	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  indicate	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  should	  be	  more	  accurate	  at	  recognising	  emotions,	  both	  in	  adults	  and	  children.	  Robinson	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  tested	  emotion	  recognition	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  Scottish	  offenders	  (only	  17.2%	  were	  sexual	  offenders,	  however	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  offender	  groups	  for	  the	  emotions	  of	  fear	  and	  anger)	  and	  found	  that	  fear	  was	  the	  least	  accurately	  recognised	  emotion	  (average	  of	  4.2	  correct	  responses	  out	  of	  10).	  In	  addition,	  the	  offenders	  were	  much	  better	  at	  recognising	  anger	  (average	  of	  6.3	  correct	  responses	  out	  of	  10).	  	  
1.5.3.	  Emotion	  recognition	  abilities	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  tested	  75	  offenders	  (11	  of	  whom	  had	  committed	  sexual	  offences	  against	  children)	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  between	  facial	  expressions,	  using	  Ekman	  and	  Friesen’s	  pictures	  of	  facial	  affect	  (Ekman	  &	  Friesen,	  1976),	  and	  found	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  performed	  significantly	  poorer	  than	  the	  other	  groups	  of	  offenders	  on	  the	  task.	  More	  specifically,	  sexual	  offenders	  most	  often	  mistook	  expressions	  of	  fear	  for	  surprise,	  and	  their	  recognition	  of	  fear	  was	  lower	  than	  for	  the	  five	  other	  emotions.	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  suggested	  that	  this	  mistake	  may	  serve	  to	  facilitate	  offending,	  rather	  than	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inhibit	  it;	  being	  that	  fear	  is	  a	  negative	  emotion,	  whereas	  surprise	  is	  mostly	  positive,	  an	  offender	  could	  mistake	  a	  frightened	  child	  for	  a	  child	  who	  is	  interested	  in	  sexual	  activity	  without	  knowing	  their	  error.	  In	  a	  second	  study,	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  examined	  child	  sexual	  offenders’	  ability	  to	  recognise	  emotional	  states	  in	  children,	  relative	  to	  a	  group	  of	  non-­‐offender	  controls.	  To	  do	  this,	  they	  used	  the	  Emotional	  Expression	  subset	  of	  the	  Test	  of	  Social	  Intelligence	  (O'Sullivan	  &	  Guilford,	  1976).	  This	  test	  contains	  line	  drawings	  of	  adults	  and	  so	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  employed	  a	  local	  artist	  to	  produce	  a	  matching	  set	  of	  drawings	  with	  child	  faces.	  The	  child	  drawings	  were	  then	  tested	  for	  accuracy	  against	  the	  adult	  drawings	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  university	  students.	  Only	  images	  that	  were	  accurately	  identified	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  students	  were	  used.	  For	  this	  study	  the	  participants	  were	  20	  male	  non-­‐familial	  sexual	  offenders	  against	  children	  with	  female	  victims	  and	  20	  male	  community	  controls.	  The	  participants	  had	  to	  identify	  the	  emotion	  expressed	  in	  each	  image,	  from	  a	  selection	  of	  four	  responses.	  Offenders	  were	  significantly	  less	  accurate	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  at	  recognising	  emotions	  in	  both	  adults	  and	  children,	  although	  they	  had	  no	  specific	  deficit	  for	  recognising	  emotions	  in	  children.	  However,	  the	  stimuli	  used	  in	  this	  study	  were	  not	  ideal.	  While	  the	  line	  drawings	  could	  be	  accurately	  identified	  by	  students,	  they	  were	  not	  tested	  on	  offenders	  prior	  to	  the	  study.	  In	  addition,	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  did	  not	  provide	  accuracy	  data	  for	  this	  study	  so	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  know	  how	  accurate	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  were,	  only	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  significantly	  more	  accurate.	  Given	  that	  the	  literature	  points	  towards	  a	  general	  deficit	  in	  the	  emotion	  recognition	  of	  sexual	  offenders,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  offenders	  would	  struggle	  more	  with	  drawings	  of	  emotion	  than	  they	  would	  with	  photographs.	  The	  present	  study	  aims	  to	  address	  this	  limitation	  by	  using	  high	  quality	  photographs	  from	  a	  standard	  set	  with	  both	  adult	  and	  child	  models	  (Radboud	  Faces	  Database;	  Langner	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  addition,	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  had	  low	  participant	  numbers	  and	  this	  could	  be	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  differences	  between	  participants’	  recognition	  of	  adult	  and	  child	  faces.	  Gery	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  tested	  child	  sexual	  offenders’	  ability	  to	  recognise	  emotions	  at	  varying	  intensities.	  They	  found	  that	  sex	  offenders	  (in	  particular,	  child	  molesters)	  were	  less	  sensitive	  in	  recognizing	  the	  facial	  expressions	  of	  fear	  and	  surprise	  (often	  confusing	  the	  former	  for	  the	  latter)	  than	  non-­‐sex	  offenders	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or	  normal	  controls.	  In	  fact,	  their	  recognition	  accuracy	  of	  fearful	  facial	  expressions	  was	  less	  than	  10%	  at	  40%	  and	  100%	  intensity	  of	  the	  emotion,	  and	  they	  could	  not	  recognise	  it	  at	  all	  at	  70%	  intensity,	  whereas	  non-­‐sex	  offenders	  and	  controls	  were	  able	  to	  recognise	  these	  emotions	  at	  75-­‐100%	  accuracy	  for	  all	  intensities.	  Sex	  offenders’	  recognition	  of	  surprise	  was	  much	  better	  but	  not	  above	  chance	  levels	  at	  any	  intensity.	  The	  differing	  intensity	  levels	  were	  made	  using	  face	  morphing	  software	  that	  combined	  different	  amounts	  of	  neutral	  and	  emotional	  faces.	  However,	  like	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993),	  Gery	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  likely	  had	  low	  statistical	  power	  due	  to	  a	  small	  sample	  size.	  In	  addition,	  their	  use	  of	  the	  signal	  detection	  measure	  d’	  was	  questionable	  because	  their	  experimental	  design	  used	  a	  forced-­‐choice	  with	  seven	  alternatives.	  The	  use	  of	  standard	  formulas	  for	  d’	  is	  only	  appropriate	  for	  two-­‐alternative	  forced	  choice	  (2AFC)	  procedures	  (Stanislaw	  &	  Todorov,	  1999).	  In	  contrast,	  a	  study	  by	  Oliver,	  Watson,	  Gannon,	  and	  Beech	  (2009)	  suggests	  that	  even	  when	  sexually	  primed,	  sex	  offenders	  are	  able	  to	  accurately	  recognise	  fear	  in	  photographs	  of	  individuals.	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  used	  a	  computer-­‐based	  task	  to	  investigate	  the	  emotional	  recognition	  skills	  of	  23	  male	  child	  sexual	  offenders.	  The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  two	  phases	  (prime	  and	  probe)	  and	  measured	  both	  response	  time	  and	  error	  rates	  to	  facial	  expressions	  of	  surprise	  and	  fear,	  presented	  using	  Ekman	  and	  Friesen’s	  pictures	  of	  facial	  affect	  (Ekman	  &	  Friesen,	  1976).	  The	  priming	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  short	  phrases	  via	  computer	  of	  either	  sexual	  (e.g.	  “You	  caress	  her	  nipple”)	  or	  neutral	  (e.g.	  “You	  brush	  your	  teeth”)	  content.	  The	  probe	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  adult	  facial	  expressions	  depicting	  either	  the	  emotion	  fear	  or	  surprise.	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  found	  that	  overall,	  the	  recognition	  rates	  of	  the	  child	  sex	  offenders	  were	  slightly	  lower	  than	  a	  control	  group	  of	  non-­‐offenders,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  significant.	  However,	  when	  sexually	  primed,	  the	  child	  sex	  offenders	  became	  significantly	  more	  accurate	  at	  recognizing	  fear	  and	  less	  accurate	  at	  recognizing	  surprise.	  The	  same	  pattern	  emerged	  for	  the	  non-­‐offenders,	  although	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  change	  was	  not	  significant.	  The	  child	  sex	  offenders	  were	  also	  faster	  at	  recognizing	  fearful	  facial	  affect	  under	  the	  sexual	  priming	  condition	  relative	  to	  the	  neutral	  priming	  condition.	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  suggested	  that	  although	  child	  sex	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offenders	  may	  be	  better	  at	  recognizing	  fear	  in	  their	  victims	  when	  sexually	  aroused,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  actively	  filter	  out	  this	  sign	  of	  distress,	  or	  simply	  fail	  to	  attend	  to	  it.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  offenders	  “…have	  developed	  a	  cognitive	  association	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	  sex,	  children,	  and	  arrest	  that	  has	  left	  them	  hypervigilant	  and	  more	  susceptible	  to	  recognizing	  fearful	  affect…”	  (Oliver	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  p.302)	  when	  sex	  related	  concepts	  are	  activated.	  Nevertheless,	  these	  results	  highlight	  an	  important	  issue	  that	  warrants	  further	  investigation,	  and	  certainly	  supports	  studies	  that	  have	  found	  empathy	  deficits	  in	  child	  sexual	  offenders.	  However,	  like	  Gery	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  the	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  study	  suffers	  from	  several	  limitations.	  Namely,	  Oliver	  et	  al.’s	  results	  did	  not	  reach	  significance	  and	  their	  sample	  size	  was	  small	  (23	  offenders	  and	  26	  controls).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  generalise	  from	  their	  results	  to	  the	  population	  they	  sampled.	  In	  addition,	  while	  empirically	  validated,	  Ekman	  and	  Friesen’s	  pictures	  of	  facial	  affect	  (1976)	  are	  relatively	  low	  quality,	  black	  and	  white	  images	  and	  arguably	  do	  not	  provide	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  faces	  seen	  during	  an	  offender’s	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life.	  	  	  Although	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  emotion	  recognition	  abilities	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  is	  not	  extensive,	  several	  studies	  that	  have	  been	  conducted	  suggest	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  likely	  have	  deficits	  in	  their	  emotion	  recognition	  abilities.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  when	  sexually	  aroused,	  offenders	  may	  actually	  become	  more	  sensitive	  to	  recognising	  fear	  in	  potential	  victims.	  This	  result	  is	  particularly	  concerning,	  as	  it	  would	  imply	  that	  offenders	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  distress	  of	  their	  victims	  while	  committing	  an	  offence.	  Nevertheless,	  more	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  about	  the	  recognition	  abilities	  of	  child	  sexual	  offenders,	  and	  to	  determine	  whether	  training	  in	  this	  area	  would	  be	  a	  worthwhile	  addition	  to	  treatment	  programmes.	  	  
1.6.	  Summary	  and	  present	  study	  	  	  Given	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  sexual	  offending,	  both	  to	  the	  victims	  and	  society	  at	  large,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  pursue	  any	  avenue	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  re-­‐offending,	  or	  a	  drop	  in	  first	  offences.	  Previous	  research	  has	  suggested	  that	  child	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sexual	  offenders	  may	  have	  deficits	  in	  recognising	  facial	  affect	  in	  adults	  relative	  to	  non-­‐offenders,	  however,	  besides	  the	  Hudson	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  study,	  this	  research	  has	  not	  examined	  child	  sexual	  offenders'	  ability	  to	  recognise	  emotions	  in	  children.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  gap	  in	  the	  research	  literature	  considering	  that	  these	  offenders	  victimise	  children.	  In	  addition,	  previous	  research	  has	  suffered	  from	  low	  participant	  numbers	  and	  thus	  these	  studies	  would	  have	  low	  statistical	  power,	  which	  reduces	  the	  chance	  of	  finding	  legitimate	  significant	  differences.	  Therefore,	  the	  present	  study	  aims	  to	  build	  upon	  previous	  research	  on	  emotion	  recognition	  with	  sexual	  offenders	  by	  addressing	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  in	  prior	  studies.	  Namely,	  we	  plan	  to	  use	  a	  larger	  sample	  of	  child	  sex	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  examine	  both	  groups’	  recognition	  of	  facial	  affect	  in	  children.	  We	  will	  also	  seek	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  psychopathic	  personality	  traits	  and	  IQ,	  as	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  suggested	  a	  potential	  link	  between	  these	  variables	  and	  recognition	  ability	  may	  be	  present.	  In	  addition,	  we	  will	  be	  creating	  stimuli	  by	  morphing	  two	  emotional	  faces	  together	  to	  create	  a	  continuum	  from	  the	  first	  emotion	  to	  the	  second	  in	  10%	  increments.	  This	  morphing	  procedure	  has	  been	  used	  in	  several	  studies,	  including	  studies	  with	  offenders	  (e.g.	  Jusyte	  &	  Schönenberg,	  2014;	  Pollak	  &	  Kistler,	  2002;	  Pollak	  &	  Tolley-­‐Schell,	  2003;	  Schönenberg	  &	  Jusyte,	  2014).	  We	  are	  also	  able	  to	  test	  participants’	  responses	  to	  ambiguous	  facial	  expressions,	  as	  research	  suggests	  that	  aggressive	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attribute	  ambiguous	  expressions	  as	  hostile	  (Schönenberg	  &	  Jusyte,	  2014).	  Finally,	  we	  will	  use	  a	  two-­‐alternative	  forced	  choice	  (2AFC)	  procedure	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  analyse	  the	  results	  using	  signal	  detection	  measures,	  which	  will	  provide	  separate	  measures	  of	  bias	  and	  discriminability.	  	  	  Our	  aims	  for	  this	  research	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  1. To	  compare	  the	  accuracy	  of	  sexual	  offenders’	  judgments	  of	  emotions	  in	  adult	  and	  child	  faces,	  and	  determine	  if	  there	  are	  deficits	  relative	  to	  a	  control	  group	  of	  non-­‐offenders.	  2. To	  determine	  whether	  child	  sex	  offenders	  show	  more	  bias	  towards	  positive	  emotions	  than	  a	  comparable	  group	  of	  non-­‐offenders.	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3. To	  determine	  whether	  child	  sex	  offenders	  show	  a	  specific	  deficit	  when	  discriminating	  between	  emotions	  in	  children	  than	  a	  comparable	  group	  of	  non-­‐offenders.	  	  
Method	  
2.1	  Participants	  
	   The	  sample	  of	  participants	  consisted	  of	  two	  groups:	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders.	  Altogether	  49	  male	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  and	  46	  male	  non-­‐offenders	  completed	  the	  experiment.	  	  
2.1.1	  Child	  Sexual	  Offenders	  
	   All	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  were	  residing	  at	  the	  Kia	  Marama	  (N	  =	  42)	  and	  Totara	  (N	  =	  7)	  Units	  at	  Rolleston	  Prison	  in	  Christchurch,	  New	  Zealand.	  These	  are	  both	  special	  treatment	  units	  (STU)	  for	  sexual	  offenders	  against	  children.	  Of	  the	  child	  sexual	  offenders:	  4	  men	  had	  yet	  to	  undergo	  treatment,	  14	  men	  were	  currently	  undergoing	  treatment,	  and	  29	  men	  had	  completed	  treatment	  and	  were	  participating	  in	  a	  graduate’s	  consolidation	  programme.	  The	  average	  age	  of	  the	  offenders	  was	  46.37	  years	  (SD	  =	  13.29	  years,	  range	  =	  21-­‐72).	  Of	  the	  sample,	  61.22%	  identified	  as	  Pākehā,	  30.61%	  as	  Māori,	  and	  8.16%	  as	  Other.	  
	  
2.1.2.	  Non-­‐Offenders	  
	   The	  sample	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  was	  obtained	  from	  both	  a	  selection	  of	  university	  students	  (N	  =	  29),	  and	  members	  of	  the	  community	  who	  were	  not	  currently	  attending	  an	  educational	  institution,	  or	  had	  already	  graduated	  from	  one	  (N	  =	  17).	  The	  students’	  sample	  was	  made	  up	  of	  both	  first	  year	  students	  participating	  for	  course	  credit,	  and	  older	  students	  participating	  for	  an	  incentive.	  The	  average	  age	  of	  the	  student	  sample	  was	  20.64	  years	  (SD	  =	  2.59,	  range	  =	  18-­‐28	  years)	  and	  the	  average	  age	  of	  the	  community	  sample	  was	  34.18	  years	  (SD	  =	  16.01,	  range	  =	  22-­‐67	  years).	  Overall,	  the	  average	  age	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  was	  25.67	  years	  (SD	  =	  11.61).	  Of	  the	  sample,	  76.09%	  identified	  as	  Pākehā,	  2.17%	  as	  Māori,	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and	  21.74%	  as	  Other.	  
2.2	  Procedure	  
	  Participants	  were	  informed	  about	  the	  study	  and	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  consent,	  or	  decline	  to	  participate.	  Participants	  that	  consented	  completed	  the	  facial	  affect	  recognition	  task	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  received	  $10	  compensation	  for	  their	  participation.	  Participants	  were	  seated	  in	  front	  of	  a	  computer	  screen	  (22”	  Philips	  monitor	  for	  non-­‐offenders,	  and	  a	  15”	  laptop	  for	  offenders).	  Offenders	  then	  proceeded	  straight	  to	  the	  recognition	  task,	  however,	  non-­‐offenders	  first	  completed	  the	  Levenson	  Self-­‐Report	  Psychopathy	  Scale	  (LSRP;	  M.	  R.	  Levenson,	  Kiehl,	  &	  Fitzpatrick,	  1995).	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  recognition	  task,	  participants	  answered	  a	  series	  of	  demographic	  questions	  about	  their	  age,	  ethnicity,	  occupation	  (before	  arrest	  for	  offenders),	  and	  highest	  level	  of	  education.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  Facial	  Affect	  Recognition	  Task	  
	  	   The	  experimental	  procedure	  was	  built	  in	  E-­‐Prime	  (E-­‐Prime	  2.0,	  Psychology	  Software	  Tools	  Inc.,	  Sharpsburg,	  PA,	  USA).	  The	  facial	  affect	  recognition	  task	  consisted	  of	  six	  blocks	  of	  trials,	  each	  block	  consisting	  of	  40	  trials.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  steps	  of	  a	  typical	  trial.	  Each	  trial	  began	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  fixation	  cross	  for	  500ms.	  Participants	  were	  then	  presented	  with	  a	  morphed	  face	  for	  1.5s	  before	  the	  option	  to	  respond	  was	  available.	  In	  each	  block,	  responses	  were	  a	  forced	  choice	  between	  2	  different	  emotions	  (selected	  from	  sadness,	  anger,	  happiness,	  and	  fear).	  Participants	  had	  as	  long	  as	  they	  needed	  to	  make	  their	  choice,	  however	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  make	  quick	  decisions.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  each	  block,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  four	  practice	  trials	  of	  full	  emotions	  (no	  morphs	  were	  used	  for	  practice	  trials),	  two	  for	  each	  of	  the	  emotions	  in	  that	  block	  posed	  by	  one	  randomly	  selected	  model	  from	  each	  age	  group	  and	  sex	  (1	  man,	  1	  woman,	  1	  boy,	  and	  1	  girl).	  These	  practice	  trials	  were	  to	  orient	  the	  participant	  to	  the	  two	  emotions	  that	  were	  to	  be	  discriminated	  between	  in	  that	  block,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  familiarise	  them	  with	  the	  experimental	  design.	  Between	  trials,	  a	  1.5	  second	  delay	  was	  presented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  blank	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Figure	  1.	  Step	  by	  step	  process	  of	  a	  typical	  trial	  	  
2.3	  Measures	  
	   	  
2.3.1	  Descriptive	  measures	  	  The	  highest	  level	  of	  education	  was	  measured	  on	  an	  eight-­‐point	  scale:	  Primary	  School	  =	  1;	  Secondary	  School	  without	  School	  Certificate	  or	  NCEA	  =	  2;	  School	  Certificate/NCEA	  Lv1	  =	  3;	  Sixth	  Form	  Certificate/NCEA	  Lv2	  =	  4;	  Bursary/NCEA	  Lv3	  =	  5;	  Technical	  or	  Trade	  Qualification	  =	  6;	  University	  Graduate	  =	  7;	  and	  Postgraduate	  Qualification	  =	  8.	  Occupation	  was	  used	  to	  measure	  socio-­‐economic	  status	  (SES)	  according	  to	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Standard	  Classification	  of	  Occupations	  (ANZSCO)	  and	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Index	  (NZSEI-­‐06;	  Milne,	  Byun,	  &	  Lee,	  2013).	  Occupations	  were	  first	  classified	  as	  belonging	  to	  one	  of	  eight	  major	  groups:	  managers,	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professionals,	  technicians	  and	  trades	  workers,	  community	  and	  personal	  service	  workers,	  clerical	  and	  administrative	  workers,	  sales	  workers,	  machinery	  operators	  and	  drivers,	  and	  labourers	  using	  the	  ANZSCO	  classifications	  and	  then	  assigned	  an	  SES	  score	  using	  the	  NZSEI-­‐06.	  NZSEI-­‐06	  scores	  range	  from	  10	  (lowest)	  to	  90	  (highest).	  SES	  scores	  for	  offenders	  were	  determined	  based	  on	  their	  occupation	  prior	  to	  their	  arrest.	  
	  
2.3.2	  Model	  selection	  	  Models	  were	  selected	  from	  the	  Radboud	  Faces	  Database	  (RaFD;	  Langer	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  at	  random.	  The	  RaFD	  database	  contains	  thousands	  of	  images	  of	  67	  models	  (Caucasian	  males	  and	  females,	  Caucasian	  children,	  and	  Moroccan	  Dutch	  males)	  photographed	  displaying	  8	  emotional	  expressions	  (anger,	  fear,	  sadness,	  happiness,	  disgust,	  surprise,	  contempt	  and	  neutral).	  Models	  were	  photographed	  wearing	  black	  t-­‐shirts,	  facing	  front	  on,	  and	  set	  against	  a	  neutral	  background.	  For	  this	  experiment,	  six	  adult	  actors	  were	  randomly	  selected	  from	  each	  sex	  and	  four	  children	  were	  also	  randomly	  selected	  from	  each	  sex	  (6	  women,	  6	  men,	  4	  boys,	  and	  4	  girls).	  Two	  Moroccan	  males	  were	  selected,	  as	  a	  set	  of	  emotional	  faces	  using	  New	  Zealand	  Māori	  models	  was	  not	  available.	  
	  
2.3.3	  Morphs	  	  The	  morphing	  software	  Fantamorph	  2.4.2	  (Abrosoft	  Inc,	  Beijing,	  China)	  was	  used	  to	  create	  the	  morphed	  images.	  Emotional	  expressions	  were	  morphed	  through	  10	  steps	  from	  the	  first	  to	  second	  emotional	  expression,	  allowing	  for	  static	  images	  to	  be	  created	  in	  10%	  increments	  of	  the	  second	  emotion	  (e.g.	  80%	  happiness,	  20%	  sadness).	  Figure	  2	  shows	  a	  typical	  continuum	  from	  90%	  sadness	  to	  90%	  anger,	  with	  50%	  being	  an	  equal	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  emotions,	  which	  provided	  a	  reasonably	  ambiguous	  expression.	  Full	  expressions	  (100%)	  were	  not	  used	  in	  the	  experimental	  trials	  as	  accuracy	  of	  recognition	  at	  this	  point	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  around	  100%,	  which	  would	  not	  add	  any	  useful	  data	  to	  the	  analyses.	  All	  morphed	  images	  used	  in	  this	  study	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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2.3.4	  Psychometrics	  	  We	  obtained	  scores	  on	  the	  Wechsler	  Abbreviated	  Scale	  of	  Intelligence	  (WASI;	  Wechsler,	  1999),	  for	  all	  offenders.	  Non-­‐offenders	  completed	  the	  Levenson	  Self-­‐Report	  Psychopathy	  Scale	  (LSRP;	  M.	  R.	  Levenson	  et	  al.,	  1995),	  which	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  measure	  of	  psychopathy	  and	  well	  as	  correlating	  reasonably	  well	  with	  the	  PCL-­‐R	  (Lynam,	  Whiteside,	  &	  Jones,	  1999;	  Walters,	  Brinkley,	  Magaletta,	  &	  Diamond,	  2008).	  The	  LSRP	  is	  a	  26-­‐item	  self-­‐report	  survey	  designed	  for	  non-­‐incarcerated	  populations	  consisting	  of	  two	  factors:	  primary	  psychopathy	  (affective	  aspects	  of	  psychopathy	  e.g.	  lack	  of	  empathy)	  and	  secondary	  psychopathy	  (antisocial	  aspects	  of	  psychopathy	  e.g.	  rule	  breaking).	  	  	  
2.3.5	  Definitions	  
	  
	   For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  experiment,	  the	  definitions	  of	  fear,	  happiness,	  sadness,	  and	  anger	  are	  as	  follows	  (taken	  from	  Ekman	  &	  Cordaro,	  2011):	  
• Fear	  –	  The	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  harm,	  physical	  or	  psychological.	  Fear	  activates	  impulses	  to	  freeze	  or	  flee.	  Often	  fear	  triggers	  anger.	  
• Happiness	  -­‐	  Feelings	  that	  are	  enjoyed,	  that	  are	  sought	  by	  the	  person.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  quite	  different	  enjoyable	  emotions,	  each	  triggered	  by	  a	  different	  event,	  involving	  a	  different	  signal	  and	  likely	  behaviour.	  
• Sadness	  -­‐	  The	  response	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  an	  object	  or	  person	  to	  which	  you	  are	  very	  attached.	  The	  prototypical	  experience	  is	  the	  death	  of	  a	  loved	  child,	  parent,	  or	  spouse.	  In	  sadness	  there	  is	  resignation,	  but	  in	  can	  turn	  into	  anguish	  in	  which	  there	  is	  agitation	  and	  protest	  over	  the	  loss	  and	  then	  return	  to	  sadness	  again.	  Anger	  -­‐	  The	  response	  to	  interference	  with	  our	  pursuit	  of	  a	  goal	  we	  care	  about.	  Anger	  can	  also	  be	  triggered	  by	  someone	  attempting	  to	  harm	  us	  (physically	  or	  psychologically)	  or	  someone	  we	  care	  about.	  In	  addition	  to	  removing	  the	  obstacle	  or	  stopping	  the	  harm,	  anger	  often	  involves	  the	  wish	  to	  hurt	  the	  target.	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Figure	  2.	  A	  continuum	  from	  sadness	  to	  anger	  in	  10%	  increments.	  	  
2.4	  Planned	  Data	  Analyses	  
	   First,	  we	  compared	  demographic	  information	  on	  age,	  ethnicity,	  occupation	  (prior	  to	  arrest	  for	  offenders),	  and	  level	  of	  education	  between	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders.	  Response	  data	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  accuracy	  scores,	  as	  well	  as	  measures	  of	  discriminability	  and	  bias	  according	  to	  Stanislaw	  and	  Todorov	  (1999).	  To	  measure	  accuracy,	  correct	  responses	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair	  were	  calculated	  as	  responses	  to	  the	  dominant	  emotion	  (e.g.	  for	  a	  morph	  of	  sadness	  and	  happiness	  containing	  67%	  or	  80%	  sadness,	  sadness	  would	  be	  the	  correct	  response).	  	  Responses	  to	  50%	  morphs	  were	  excluded	  from	  accuracy	  scores.	  	  Accuracy	  scores	  were	  first	  compared	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair	  across	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blocks	  of	  eight	  trials	  (five	  blocks	  or	  40	  trials	  per	  emotion	  pair)	  using	  a	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor	  and	  block	  as	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor.	  An	  omnibus	  analysis	  across	  emotion	  pairs	  was	  also	  conducted,	  again	  with	  each	  emotion	  pair	  spilt	  into	  blocks	  of	  eight	  trials,	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor	  and	  emotion	  pair	  and	  block	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  was	  to	  assess	  how	  responding	  changed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  each	  emotion	  pair	  (i.e.	  training	  effects),	  and	  whether	  any	  differences	  between	  the	  groups	  were	  independent	  of	  block.	  	  Our	  plan	  was	  to	  aggregate	  responses	  across	  blocks	  to	  calculate	  the	  signal	  detection	  measures,	  but	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  any	  effects	  of	  training	  were	  similar	  for	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders.	  	  	  Next	  we	  conducted	  signal	  detection	  analyses	  to	  provide	  separate	  measures	  of	  bias	  and	  discriminability.	  	  Bias	  indicates	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  respond	  to	  one	  alternative	  over	  the	  other,	  whereas	  discriminability	  measures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  alternatives	  are	  correctly	  identified.	  	  Bias	  scores	  were	  calculated	  with	  the	  formula:	  
	  𝛽 = 𝑒 !!! ! ]!![!!! !! ! 	   	   	   	   	   	   [1]	  Where	  H	  and	  F	  are	  hit	  rate	  and	  false	  alarm	  rate	  respectively.	  Discriminability	  scores	  were	  calculated	  with	  the	  formula:	  	   𝑑! = 𝜙!! 𝐻 − 𝜙!! 𝐹 	   	   	   	   	   	   [2]	  Bias	  and	  discriminability	  scores	  were	  analysed	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  again	  by	  emotion	  pair.	  Discriminability	  scores	  were	  also	  analysed	  in	  an	  omnibus	  fashion,	  again	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor.	  However,	  emotion	  pair	  was	  used	  as	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  as	  well	  as	  age	  (adult,	  child)	  and	  sex	  (male,	  female)	  of	  model.	  	  We	  then	  conducted	  an	  ANCOVA	  with	  age,	  education	  and	  SES	  as	  covariates,	  where	  significant	  group	  differences	  had	  emerged	  to	  determine	  if	  demographic	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  could	  explain	  differences	  in	  responding.	  Finally,	  we	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  responding	  in	  the	  emotion	  task	  and	  measures	  of	  psychopathic	  personality	  and	  IQ.	  However,	  this	  analysis	  was	  limited	  as	  we	  were	  only	  able	  to	  obtain	  psychopathy	  scores	  for	  non-­‐offenders	  and	  IQ	  scores	  for	  offenders.	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Results	  
	  
3.1	  Demographics	  	  Table	  1	  presents	  demographic	  information	  for	  the	  offender	  and	  non-­‐offender	  groups.	  Multiple	  t-­‐tests	  were	  conducted	  with	  Bonferroni	  correction	  to	  assess	  between-­‐group	  differences.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  1,	  offenders	  were	  significantly	  older	  (M	  =	  46.37	  years)	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  25.67),	  t(93)	  =	  8.06,	  p	  <	  .001,	  d	  =	  1.66,	  and	  had	  both	  lower	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  SES	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  t(93)	  =	  10.93,	  p	  <	  .001,	  d	  =	  2.25;	  and	  t(93)	  =	  6.29,	  p	  <	  .001,	  d	  =	  1.28	  respectively.	  The	  possible	  contribution	  of	  these	  variables	  to	  any	  potential	  differences	  in	  the	  Emotion	  Recognition	  Task	  between	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  is	  considered	  below.	  	  Table	  1.	  	  
Demographic	  data	  for	  all	  groups.	  (Standard	  deviations	  in	  brackets).	  	   Offenders	  	  (N	  =	  49)	   Non-­‐Offenders	  	  (N	  =	  46)	   	   t	   p	   	  
Age	   46.37	  (13.29)	   25.67	  (11.61)	   	   8.06	   <.001	   	  
Education	   2.67	  (1.55)	   5.98	  (1.39)	   	   -­‐10.93	   <.001	   	  
Socioeconomic	  
Status	  
34.08	  (10.87)	   49.91	  (13.79)	   	   -­‐6.29	   <.001	   	  
	  
3.2	  Emotion	  Recognition	  Task	  -­‐	  Accuracy	  	   	  Accuracy	  scores	  for	  the	  Emotion	  Recognition	  Task	  were	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  majority	  emotion	  for	  non-­‐50%	  morphs	  was	  the	  correct	  response	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  happy/sad	  pair,	  a	  correct	  response	  would	  be	  ‘happy’	  to	  faces	  containing	  less	  than	  50%	  sadness,	  and	  ‘sad’	  to	  faces	  containing	  more	  than	  50%	  sadness.	  Responses	  to	  50%	  morphs	  were	  not	  counted).	  Accuracy	  scores	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair	  were	  computed	  separately	  for	  each	  block	  of	  8	  trials	  (with	  40	  trials	  =	  5	  blocks	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair).	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Accuracy	  by	  emotion	  pair	  and	  block	  	  First	  we	  analysed	  responding	  across	  emotion	  pairs	  for	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders,	  to	  determine	  whether	  responding	  differed	  across	  these	  pairs.	  A	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA,	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐groups	  factor,	  and	  block	  and	  emotion	  pair	  as	  within-­‐groups	  factors	  confirmed	  that	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  emotion	  pair	  was	  found,	  F(5,465)	  =	  27.72,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .23,	  indicating	  that	  levels	  of	  accuracy	  differed	  across	  emotion	  pairs.	  A	  significant	  effect	  of	  Block	  was	  also	  found,	  F(4,372)	  =	  11.78,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .11,	  as	  accuracy	  increased	  by	  approximately	  5%	  from	  the	  first	  to	  last	  block	  of	  eight	  trials	  (81.08%	  -­‐	  86.30%).	  This	  suggests	  that	  participants	  were	  reasonably	  adept	  at	  the	  task	  overall,	  although	  they	  performed	  better	  in	  the	  final	  three	  blocks	  of	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  There	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  (p	  =	  .12),	  and	  no	  interaction	  of	  block	  and	  group	  (p	  <	  .40),	  emotion	  pair	  and	  group	  (p	  =	  .09),	  or	  emotion	  pair,	  block	  and	  group,	  suggesting	  that	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  improvement	  over	  the	  five	  blocks	  of	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  	  	  Because	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  emotion	  pair,	  we	  also	  analysed	  responding	  separately	  for	  each	  pair.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  accuracy	  scores	  for	  both	  groups	  across	  the	  five	  blocks	  of	  trials	  in	  each	  emotion	  pair,	  and	  mean	  accuracy	  scores	  for	  each	  pair	  are	  displayed	  in	  Table	  2.	  Overall,	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  similar	  levels	  of	  accuracy	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair,	  with	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions	  involving	  group,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Fear-­‐Anger.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  centre	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2,	  non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  83.71%)	  were	  overall	  more	  accurate	  than	  offenders	  (M	  =	  78.77%),	  although	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  just	  failed	  to	  reach	  significance,	  F(1,93)	  =	  3.80,	  
p	  =	  .054.	  Also	  evident	  in	  this	  emotion	  pair	  is	  a	  relatively	  sharp	  decline	  in	  offenders’	  accuracy	  in	  blocks	  three	  (M	  =	  76.54%)	  and	  four	  (M	  =	  74.25%),	  followed	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  block	  five	  (M	  =	  82.29%).	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐groups	  factor	  and	  block	  as	  a	  within-­‐groups	  factor.	  A	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  block	  was	  found	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair,	  F(4,372)	  =	  2.60,	  p	  =	  .036,	  ηp2	  =	  .03,	  but	  the	  interaction	  of	  block	  and	  group	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  .46).	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There	  were	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  of	  group	  (all	  ps	  <	  .10),	  and	  no	  interactions	  of	  block	  and	  group	  (all	  ps	  <	  .30)	  in	  any	  of	  the	  other	  emotion	  pairs.	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final	  three	  blocks.	  Overall,	  these	  results	  show	  that	  the	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  in	  how	  performance	  changed	  across	  blocks,	  and	  so	  results	  were	  aggregated	  across	  blocks	  for	  subsequent	  analyses.	  	  Table	  2.	  	  
Mean	  accuracy	  and	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  all	  emotion	  pairs.	  Emotion	  Pair	   Mean	  Accuracy	  (%)	   Discriminability	  Sadness-­‐Anger	   82.22a	   1.64	  a	  Sadness-­‐Fear	   80.70	  a	   1.66	  a	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	   90.64b	   2.07	  b	  Fear-­‐Anger	   81.16	  a	   1.65	  a	  Happiness-­‐Fear	   80.90a	   1.57	  a	  Anger-­‐Happiness	   91.60b	   2.10	  b	  Subscript	  indicates	  significant	  differences	  at	  p	  <	  .01	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Accuracy	  scores	  averaged	  across	  all	  emotion	  pairs	  in	  blocks	  of	  eight	  
trials.	  Standard	  error	  bars	  are	  shown.	  
	  
3.3 Signal	  Detection	  Measures	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Todorov	  (1999),	  equations	  1	  and	  2	  above.	  Higher	  discriminability	  values	  indicate	  that	  participants	  were	  better	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  independently	  of	  bias,	  which	  is	  an	  overall	  tendency	  to	  respond	  to	  one	  emotion	  or	  the	  other.	  Bias	  was	  calculated	  such	  that	  negative	  values	  indicated	  a	  preference	  for	  the	  first	  emotion	  in	  a	  pair,	  whereas	  positive	  values	  indicated	  a	  preference	  for	  the	  second	  emotion	  in	  a	  pair.	  	  
	  
3.3.1 Discriminability	  
	   Figure	  5	  shows	  average	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  for	  each	  model	  type	  across	  the	  six	  emotion	  pairs.	  	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor	  and	  emotion	  pair,	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factors.	  A	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  was	  found,	  showing	  that	  discriminability	  was	  overall	  higher	  for	  nonoffenders	  (offender	  M	  =	  1.73,	  non-­‐offender	  M	  =	  1.83),	  F(1,93)	  =	  5.38,	  p	  =	  .023,	  ηp2	  =	  .05.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  emotion	  pair	  was	  also	  significant	  (Sadness-­‐Anger	  M	  =	  1.64,	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  M	  =	  1.66,	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  M	  =	  2.07,	  Fear-­‐Anger	  M	  =	  1.65,	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  M	  =	  1.57,	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  M	  =	  2.10),	  F(5,465)	  =	  9.99,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .25.	  There	  were	  significant	  interactions	  between	  emotion	  pair	  and	  age,	  F(5,465)	  =	  3.43,	  p	  =	  .005,	  ηp2	  =	  .04;	  emotion	  pair	  and	  sex,	  F(5,465)	  =	  4.36,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .04;	  and	  emotion	  pair,	  age,	  and	  sex,	  F(5,465)	  =	  3.48,	  p	  =	  .004,	  ηp2	  =	  .04.	  	  None	  of	  the	  other	  interactions	  were	  significant.	  	  	  A	  general	  observation	  was	  that	  discriminability	  was	  greater	  when	  Happiness	  was	  one	  of	  the	  emotions	  than	  when	  it	  was	  not.	  	  To	  test	  this	  observation,	  post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  were	  conducted	  which	  revealed	  that	  participants	  were	  significantly	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  emotion	  pair	  than	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Anger,	  F(1,90)	  =	  57.23,	  
p	  <	  .001;	  Sadness-­‐Fear,	  F(1,90)	  =	  52.59,	  p	  <	  .001;	  and	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pairs,	  
F(1,90)	  =	  39.58,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Participants	  were	  also	  significantly	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  in	  the	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  emotion	  pair	  than	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Anger,	  F(1,90)	  =	  76.95,	  p	  <	  .001;	  Sadness-­‐Fear,	  F(1,90)	  =	  70.31,	  p	  <	  .001;	  and	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pairs,	  F(1,90)	  =	  56.08,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Interestingly,	  this	  effect	  was	  not	  observed	  in	  the	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  emotion	  pair.	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Overall,	  these	  results	  show	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  somewhat	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  than	  offenders,	  and	  that	  discriminability	  scores	  varied	  depending	  on	  the	  particular	  emotion	  pair,	  such	  that	  pairs	  involving	  happiness	  were	  significantly	  easier	  to	  discriminate,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Happiness-­‐Fear.	  	  
Discriminability	  by	  emotion	  pair	  and	  model	  characteristics	  	  In	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  interactions	  reported	  above,	  we	  conducted	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVAs	  with	  group	  and	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  as	  factors,	  separately	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  These	  results	  are	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  5.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  Average	  discriminability	  scores	  across	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  Standard	  error	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Sadness-­‐Anger	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  upper	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  	  Both	  groups	  were	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  when	  judging	  adult	  faces	  than	  when	  judging	  child	  faces,	  and	  when	  judging	  female	  faces	  than	  male	  faces.	  On	  average,	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  emotions,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  significant.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  significant	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (adult	  M	  =	  1.72,	  child	  M	  =	  1.52),	  F(1,93)	  =	  7.27,	  p	  =	  .008,	  ηp2	  =	  .07;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  1.51,	  female	  M	  =	  1.74),	  F(1,93)	  =	  8.25,	  p	  =	  .005,	  ηp2	  =	  .08.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  interactions.	  	  
Sadness-­‐Fear	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  upper	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  	  	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions,	  and	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (all	  ps	  >	  .10).	  	  
Sadness-­‐Happiness	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  centre	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  age	  by	  sex	  interaction,	  F(1,93)	  =	  19.87,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .18.	  A	  test	  of	  simple	  effects	  revealed	  significant	  differences	  in	  responses	  to	  the	  different	  faces:	  higher	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  adult	  female	  (M	  =	  2.17)	  than	  adult	  male	  (M	  =	  1.92),	  p	  =	  .003;	  adult	  female	  than	  child	  female	  (M	  =	  1.98),	  p	  =	  .033;	  child	  male	  (M	  =	  2.18)	  than	  adult	  male,	  p	  <	  .001;	  and	  child	  male	  than	  child	  female,	  p	  =	  .035.	  Overall,	  responding	  was	  largely	  similar	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (offenders,	  M	  =	  2.02,	  non-­‐offenders	  M	  =	  2.11).	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Fear-­‐Anger	  	  Results	  for	  Fear-­‐Anger	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  centre	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  Non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  1.68)	  were	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  than	  offenders	  (M	  =	  1.44),	  however,	  the	  main	  effect	  only	  approached	  significance,	  F(1,93)	  =	  3.54,	  p	  =	  .06.	  Overall,	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  this	  emotion	  pair	  were	  among	  the	  lowest,	  suggesting	  that	  participants	  found	  these	  two	  emotions	  relatively	  difficult	  to	  discriminate	  between.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  1.65,	  female	  
M	  =	  1.46),	  F(1,93)	  =	  4.35,	  p	  =	  .040,	  ηp2	  =	  .04.	  There	  was	  a	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  of	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  model,	  F(1,93)	  =	  4.10,	  p	  =	  .046,	  ηp2	  =	  .04.	  A	  test	  of	  simple	  effects	  revealed	  significantly	  higher	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  adult	  male	  than	  adult	  female	  faces,	  p	  =	  .008;	  all	  other	  differences	  were	  not	  significant	  (all	  ps	  >	  .10).	  	  	  
Happiness-­‐Fear	  	  Results	  for	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions,	  and	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (all	  ps	  >	  .05).	  	  
Anger-­‐Happiness	  	  Results	  for	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5.	  Participants	  were	  significantly	  more	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  when	  judging	  female	  and	  child	  faces	  than	  when	  judging	  male	  and	  adult	  faces.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  significant	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (adult	  M	  =	  2.03,	  child	  M	  =	  2.18),	  F(1,93)	  =	  9.86,	  p	  =	  .002,	  ηp2	  =	  .10;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  2.02,	  female	  M	  =	  2.19),	  F(1,93)	  =	  7.64,	  p	  =	  .007,	  ηp2	  =	  .08.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  interactions	  or	  group	  differences.	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Summary	  	   	  Overall,	  when	  responding	  was	  averaged	  across	  all	  emotion	  pairs,	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  discriminability	  than	  offenders.	  In	  the	  individual	  emotion	  pairs	  however,	  both	  groups	  showed	  reasonably	  high	  levels	  of	  discriminability,	  although	  they	  performed	  better	  with	  some	  emotion	  pairs	  than	  others.	  In	  particular,	  both	  groups	  performed	  worse	  in	  emotion	  pairs	  containing	  two	  negative	  emotions	  (although	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  was	  an	  exception	  to	  this)	  than	  pairs	  containing	  one	  positive	  and	  one	  negative	  emotion.	  Effects	  of	  model	  characteristics	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  specific	  emotion	  pairs.	  	  	  	  
3.3.2 Bias	  by	  emotion	  pair	  and	  model	  characteristics	  
	   Figure	  6	  shows	  average	  bias	  scores	  for	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  across	  each	  of	  the	  six	  emotion	  pairs.	  	  Positive	  bias	  values	  indicate	  a	  greater	  tendency	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  second	  emotion	  in	  the	  pair,	  while	  negative	  values	  indicate	  a	  greater	  tendency	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  first	  emotion	  in	  the	  pair.	  Because	  both	  relative	  (i.e.,	  whether	  bias	  depends	  on	  group	  and	  model	  characteristics)	  and	  absolute	  (i.e.,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  bias	  towards	  a	  particular	  emotion)	  levels	  of	  bias	  are	  of	  interest,	  we	  first	  report	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVAs	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair	  and	  then	  confidence	  intervals	  (Table	  2)	  to	  test	  whether	  bias	  values	  deviate	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  	  Because	  bias	  values	  are	  specific	  to	  emotion	  pairs	  and	  their	  sign	  is	  arbitrary,	  we	  do	  not	  report	  an	  omnibus	  ANOVA	  across	  emotion	  pairs	  but	  rather	  separate	  ANOVAs	  to	  examine	  relative	  bias	  for	  each	  pair.	  	  	  	  
Sadness-­‐Anger	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  upper	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions,	  and	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (all	  ps	  >	  .10).	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Sadness-­‐Fear	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  upper	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  On	  average,	  offenders	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  sadness	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  although	  the	  difference	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  .35).	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (adult	  M	  =	  -­‐.01,	  child	  
M	  =	  .24),	  F(1,93)	  =	  26.86,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .22;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  .18,	  female	  M	  =	  .05),	  F(1,93)	  =	  7.17,	  p	  =	  .009,	  ηp2	  =	  .07.	  The	  age	  by	  sex	  interaction	  was	  also	  significant,	  F(1,93)	  =	  30.56,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .025.	  A	  test	  of	  simple	  effects	  revealed	  significant	  differences	  in	  responses	  to	  the	  different	  faces:	  participants	  showed	  a	  bias	  towards	  sadness	  for	  adult	  females	  but	  fear	  for	  all	  other	  faces	  (ps	  <	  .001);	  and	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  fear	  for	  child	  females	  than	  child	  males	  (p	  <	  .001).	  
	  
Sadness-­‐Happiness	  	  Results	  for	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  centre	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  Participants	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  happiness	  when	  judging	  adult	  faces	  than	  child	  faces,	  and	  male	  faces	  than	  female	  faces.	  Noticeable	  is	  the	  change	  in	  bias	  in	  responding	  from	  sadness	  for	  child	  female	  faces,	  to	  happiness	  for	  all	  other	  faces.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  .11,	  female	  M	  =	  .03),	  F(1,93)	  =	  5.30,	  p	  =	  .024,	  ηp2	  =	  .05;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  .15,	  female	  M	  =	  -­‐.01),	  F(1,93)	  =	  21.26,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .19.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  interactions	  or	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  	  
	  
Fear-­‐Anger	  	  Results	  for	  Fear-­‐Anger	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  centre	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (adult	  M	  =	  .08,	  child	  M	  =	  -­‐.02),	  F(1,93)	  =	  7.86,	  p	  =	  .006,	  ηp2	  =	  .08;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  -­‐.12,	  female	  M	  =	  .18),	  F(1,93)	  =	  47.99,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .34.	  There	  were	  also	  significant	  interactions:	  sex	  of	  model	  and	  group,	  F(1,93)	  =	  8.30,	  p	  =	  .005,	  ηp2	  =	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Figure	  6.	  Average	  bias	  scores	  across	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  Standard	  error	  bars	  are	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offenders	  showed	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  responding,	  although	  they	  showed	  less	  bias	  towards	  both	  emotions	  (M	  =	  -­‐.02	  and	  .16	  respectively,	  p	  =	  .005).	  	  	   Participants	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  anger	  when	  judging	  adult	  female	  faces	  than	  adult	  male	  faces	  (p	  =	  .022).	  However,	  most	  noticeable	  is	  the	  large	  change	  in	  bias	  with	  child	  male	  (M	  =	  -­‐.27)	  and	  child	  female	  (M	  =	  .22,	  p	  <	  .001)	  models.	  Both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  the	  strongest	  bias	  towards	  responding	  anger	  when	  judging	  child	  females,	  and	  the	  strongest	  bias	  towards	  responding	  fear	  when	  judging	  child	  males.	  	  	  
Happiness-­‐Fear	  	   Results	  for	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  effects.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  model,	  F(1,93)	  =	  5.92,	  p	  =	  .017,	  ηp2	  =	  .06.	  Overall,	  both	  groups	  responded	  similarly,	  showing	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  the	  emotion	  as	  fear	  when	  judging	  child	  female	  faces	  than	  when	  judging	  child	  male	  faces	  (p	  =	  .004).	  Offenders	  did	  show	  more	  bias	  when	  judging	  male	  faces	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  and	  the	  reverse	  was	  true	  for	  female	  faces,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  .08).	  	  
Anger-­‐Happiness	  	  Results	  for	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  6.	  A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  revealed	  two	  significant	  main	  effects:	  age	  of	  model	  (adult	  M	  =	  .17,	  child	  M	  =	  .07),	  F(1,93)	  =	  9.31,	  p	  =	  .003,	  ηp2	  =	  .10;	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  (male	  M	  =	  .18,	  female	  M	  =	  .07),	  F(1,93)	  =	  10.87,	  p	  =	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .10.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  model,	  F(1,93)	  =	  5.52,	  p	  =	  .021,	  ηp2	  =	  .06.	  A	  test	  of	  simple	  effects	  revealed	  participants	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  happiness	  when	  judging	  adult	  male,	  adult	  female	  and	  child	  male	  faces	  than	  when	  judging	  child	  female	  faces	  (ps	  <	  .001).	  	  Table	  3	  reports	  mean	  bias	  values	  and	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  Table	  3	  shows	  that	  bias	  values	  were	  higher	  for	  some	  emotion	  pairs	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than	  others,	  and	  often	  participants	  would	  show	  bias	  towards	  one	  emotion	  for	  a	  particular	  model,	  and	  towards	  the	  other	  emotion	  for	  another	  model.	  Overall,	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  average	  bias	  values	  excluded	  zero,	  indicating	  significant	  levels	  of	  absolute	  bias	  in	  all	  emotion	  pairs,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Fear-­‐Anger.	  	  The	  strongest	  levels	  of	  bias	  were	  obtained	  with	  Happiness-­‐Fear,	  where	  participants	  showed	  a	  tendency	  to	  identify	  fear	  regardless	  of	  model	  characteristics.	  	  	  	  Table	  3.	  	  
Means	  and	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  average	  bias	  values	  (positive	  values	  
indicate	  a	  bias	  for	  the	  second	  emotion	  in	  the	  pair).	  Emotion	  Pair:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Model	  Type	   Mean	  bias	  values	  (95%	  CI)	  
Sadness-­‐Anger:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Child	  Female	  
	  
0.052	  (0.003	  –	  0.101)	  0.082	  (-­‐0.012	  –	  0.177)	  0.052	  (-­‐0.039	  –	  0.143)	  -­‐0.032	  (-­‐0.150	  –	  0.087)	  
0.104	  (0.007	  –	  0.201)	  
Sadness-­‐Fear:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  Child	  Female	  
	  
0.113	  (0.068	  –	  0.158)	  
0.189	  (0.102	  –	  0.276)	  
-­‐0.209	  (-­‐0.312	  –	  -­‐0.105)	  
0.162	  (0.068	  –	  0.257)	  
0.309	  (0.222	  –	  0.397)	  
Sadness-­‐Happiness:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  Child	  Female	  
	  
0.069	  (0.019	  –	  0.118)	  
0.169	  (0.083	  –	  0.255)	  0.047	  (-­‐0.018	  –	  0.112)	  
0.128	  (0.071	  –	  0.186)	  -­‐0.070	  (-­‐0.158	  –	  0.018)	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Fear-­‐Anger:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Child	  Female	  
	  0.030	  (-­‐0.020	  –	  0.080)	  0.025	  (-­‐.058	  –	  0.108)	  
0.138	  (0.064	  –	  0.211)	  
-­‐0.265	  (-­‐0.373	  –	  -­‐0.157)	  
0.221	  (0.130	  –	  0.312)	  
Happiness-­‐Fear:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Child	  Female	  
	  
0.391(0.333	  –	  0.449)	  
0.409	  (0.321	  –	  0.497)	  
0.372	  (0.290	  –	  0.454)	  
0.309	  (0.218	  –	  0.400)	  
0.475	  (0.382	  –	  0.567)	  
Anger-­‐Happiness:	  Average	  Adult	  Male	  Adult	  Female	  Child	  Male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Child	  Female	  
	  
0.121	  (0.078	  –	  0.164)	  
0.187	  (0.100	  –	  0.274)	  
0.151	  (0.090	  –	  0.211)	  
0.164	  (0.099	  –	  0.229)	  -­‐0.015	  (-­‐0.076	  –	  0.046)	  
Intervals	  in	  boldface	  do	  not	  include	  0	  and	  are	  therefore	  significantly	  different	  from	  
0	  at	  p	  <	  .05.	  
	  
Summary	  	   	  Overall,	  Offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  similar	  levels	  of	  bias	  when	  responding	  to	  the	  models.	  However,	  a	  significant	  difference	  emerged	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair,	  where	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  responding	  fear	  when	  judging	  male	  faces	  than	  offenders.	  When	  responses	  were	  averaged	  across	  the	  groups,	  the	  direction	  of	  bias	  was	  often	  dependent	  on	  the	  model	  type	  (male	  or	  female,	  adult	  or	  child),	  although	  this	  varied	  depending	  on	  the	  emotion	  pair.	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3.4	  Analysis	  of	  covariance	  	  	  Because	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  differed	  significantly	  in	  terms	  of	  age,	  education	  and	  SES	  (see	  Table	  1),	  it	  is	  important	  to	  determine	  if	  differences	  on	  these	  demographic	  variables	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  significant	  group	  differences	  in	  the	  responding	  that	  was	  found	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair.	  	  To	  evaluate	  this	  possibility	  we	  conducted	  an	  ANCOVA.	  	  	  First,	  we	  wished	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  demographic	  variables	  obtained	  were	  correlated	  with	  bias	  and	  discriminability.	  Table	  4	  displays	  correlations	  of	  age,	  education	  and	  SES	  with	  discriminability	  scores	  for	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  However,	  the	  NZSEI-­‐06	  does	  not	  have	  a	  category	  for	  students	  and	  so	  their	  SES	  score	  is	  based	  on	  their	  highest	  level	  of	  education,	  making	  comparisons	  difficult	  to	  interpret.	  When	  averaged	  across	  all	  emotion	  pairs,	  discriminability	  was	  significantly	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  age	  (r	  =	  -­‐.34,	  p	  <	  .001)	  and	  positively	  correlated	  with	  education	  (r	  =	  .20,	  p	  =	  .045).	  Bias	  values	  were	  not	  averaged	  across	  emotion	  pairs.	  When	  examining	  individual	  emotion	  pairs,	  age	  was	  the	  only	  demographic	  variable	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  discriminability,	  and	  only	  in	  the	  pairs	  of	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  (r	  =	  -­‐.22,	  p	  =	  .036)	  and	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  (r	  =	  -­‐.25,	  p	  =	  .016).	  Bias	  scores	  were	  not	  correlated	  with	  any	  of	  the	  demographic	  variables;	  therefore	  these	  correlations	  are	  not	  presented	  in	  the	  table.	  Due	  to	  the	  significant	  correlations	  of	  both	  age	  and	  education	  with	  discriminability,	  an	  ANCOVA	  was	  performed	  on	  the	  emotion	  pair	  where	  a	  significant	  group	  difference	  was	  found	  (Fear-­‐Anger),	  with	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐groups	  variable	  and	  age,	  education,	  and	  SES	  as	  covariates.	  	  	   Results	  from	  the	  ANCOVA	  revealed	  that	  none	  of	  the	  demographic	  variables	  were	  significant	  predictors	  of	  bias	  scores	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair:	  Age	  
F(1,90)	  =	  0.49,	  p	  =	  .49;	  education	  F(1,90)	  =	  0.12,	  p	  =	  .73;	  SES	  F(1,90)	  =	  2.02,	  p	  =	  .16.	  There	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  (p	  =	  .14),	  and	  no	  interactions	  involving	  the	  demographic	  variables,	  model	  characteristics,	  or	  group.	  However,	  the	  interaction	  of	  group	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  remained	  significant	  F(1,90)	  =	  4.44,	  p	  =	  .038.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  differences	  in	  responding	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  in	  this	  emotion	  pair	  were	  not	  due	  to	  the	  factors	  of	  age,	  education,	  or	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socioeconomic	  status.	  However,	  age	  was	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  overall	  discriminability	  scores,	  F(1,90)	  =	  5.31,	  p	  =	  .023,	  and	  with	  age	  or	  level	  of	  education	  as	  a	  covariate,	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  was	  no	  longer	  significant,	  
F(1,90)	  =	  0.01,	  p	  =	  .94	  and	  F(1,92)	  =	  1.47,	  p	  =	  .23,	  respectively.	  	  Ethnicity	  was	  also	  investigated	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  a	  separate	  analysis.	  However	  it	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  either	  bias	  or	  discriminability	  scores	  in	  any	  of	  the	  emotion	  pairs	  (all	  ps	  >	  .10),	  suggesting	  that	  both	  Māori	  and	  non-­‐Māori	  responded	  similarly	  to	  the	  task.	  	  	  Table	  4.	  	  








	  -­‐.34**	  -­‐.15	  -­‐.03	  -­‐.22*	  -­‐.16	  -­‐.25*	  -­‐.17	  
	  .20*	  .10	  .08	  .12	  .15	  .10	  .04	  
	  .08	  -­‐.04	  .11	  .05	  .12	  -­‐.00	  -­‐.03	  Age	  Education	  SES	  
-­‐	  -­‐	  -­‐	  
-­‐.48**	  -­‐	  -­‐	  
-­‐.22*	  .73**	  -­‐	  
*	  	  	  	  	  Significant	  at	  p	  <	  .05	  
**	  	  	  Significant	  at	  p	  <	  .01	  	  
3.5 Psychometrics	  
	  Previous	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  both	  psychopathy	  and	  intelligence	  may	  affect	  emotion	  recognition	  abilities.	  We	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  psychopathy	  scores	  for	  non-­‐offenders	  and	  IQ	  scores	  for	  offenders	  and	  correlated	  these	  with	  both	  discriminability	  and	  bias	  scores,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  demographic	  variables,	  to	  examine	  whether	  performance	  on	  the	  emotion	  recognition	  task	  was	  related	  to	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psychopathy	  (non-­‐offenders)	  and	  IQ	  (offenders).	  	  These	  analyses	  are	  limited	  because	  we	  did	  not	  have	  either	  psychopathy	  or	  IQ	  scores	  for	  both	  groups.	  	  	  	  
3.5.1	  Levenson	  Self-­‐Report	  Psychopathy	  Scale	  (LSRP)	  
	  
	   As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  LSRP	  is	  a	  self-­‐report	  measure	  of	  psychopathy	  with	  two	  subscales.	  The	  LSRP	  was	  administered	  to	  non-­‐offenders	  and	  their	  scores	  on	  each	  subscale,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  average	  score,	  were	  recorded.	  LSRP-­‐Primary	  scores	  were	  correlated	  only	  with	  LSRP-­‐Secondary	  (r	  =	  .30,	  p	  =	  .049)	  and	  LSRP-­‐Average	  scores	  (r	  =	  .78,	  p	  <	  .001).	  However,	  LSRP-­‐Secondary	  scores	  were	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  age	  (r	  =	  -­‐.42,	  p	  =	  .005),	  SES	  (r	  =	  -­‐.34,	  p	  =	  .027),	  discriminability	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair	  (r	  =	  -­‐.32,	  p	  =	  .039),	  and	  average	  accuracy	  (r	  =-­‐.32,	  p	  =.035).	  All	  other	  correlations	  of	  LSRP-­‐S	  with	  discriminability	  and	  bias	  were	  not	  significant.	  	  
	   	  
3.5.2	  Wechsler	  Abbreviated	  Scale	  of	  Intelligence	  (WASI)	  





	   The	  present	  study	  set	  out	  to	  determine	  if	  child	  sexual	  offenders	  displayed	  deficits	  in	  recognising	  facial	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  in	  both	  adults	  and	  children,	  relative	  to	  a	  control	  sample	  of	  non-­‐offenders.	  Participants	  viewed	  images	  of	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models	  (male	  and	  female,	  adults	  and	  children),	  which	  were	  morphed	  between	  two	  different	  emotions	  in	  varying	  amounts	  (e.g.	  20%	  happiness	  -­‐	  80%	  sadness).	  The	  results	  were	  not	  entirely	  as	  expected.	  Whereas	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  significantly	  more	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  overall,	  the	  difference	  was	  relatively	  small	  and	  not	  significant	  for	  any	  of	  the	  individual	  emotion	  pairs.	  However,	  when	  age,	  education,	  and	  SES	  were	  used	  as	  covariates	  in	  an	  ANCOVA,	  the	  difference	  in	  discriminability	  was	  no	  longer	  significant.	  In	  addition,	  offenders	  did	  not	  show	  any	  specific	  deficits	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  when	  judging	  faces	  of	  children.	  However,	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  group	  and	  sex	  of	  model	  did	  emerge	  for	  bias	  scores	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair.	  Non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  significant	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  the	  emotion	  as	  fear	  rather	  than	  anger	  when	  viewing	  male	  faces,	  whereas	  offenders	  did	  not.	  In	  addition,	  both	  groups	  showed	  a	  bias	  towards	  fear	  for	  male	  faces,	  and	  anger	  for	  female	  faces.	  	  	  
4.2	  Bias	  and	  Discriminability	  	   	  	  
4.2.1	  Bias	  
	   Generally,	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  similar	  patterns	  of	  bias	  in	  each	  emotion	  pair.	  However,	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  pair,	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  significantly	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  fear	  when	  judging	  male	  faces	  than	  offenders,	  and	  this	  difference	  was	  more	  pronounced	  for	  child	  male	  faces	  than	  adult	  male	  faces	  (p	  =	  .099).	  This	  result	  could	  suggest	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  have	  an	  inhibition	  to	  identify	  anger	  due	  to	  its	  potentially	  violent	  consequences,	  although	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  adults	  would	  be	  so	  fearful	  of	  angry	  children.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  offenders	  showed	  less	  of	  a	  bias	  towards	  fear	  is	  not	  surprising	  as	  several	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  are	  more	  accurate	  at	  recognising	  angry	  than	  fearful	  expressions	  (e.g.	  Gery	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Hudson	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Robinson	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  This	  finding	  supports	  our	  results	  for	  this	  emotion	  pair,	  and	  suggests	  that	  offenders	  may	  have	  had	  more	  difficulty	  recognising	  fear	  than	  anger,	  and	  thus	  shown	  less	  of	  a	  bias	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  towards	  responding	  ‘fear’.	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Overall,	  bias	  scores	  favoured	  both	  positive	  (happiness)	  and	  negative	  (fear,	  anger	  and	  sadness)	  emotions,	  although	  participants	  generally	  showed	  a	  bias	  towards	  responding	  ‘happiness’	  when	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  two	  emotions.	  However,	  in	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  emotion	  pair,	  participants	  showed	  a	  consistently	  strong	  bias	  towards	  responding	  ‘fear’	  when	  judging	  all	  faces.	  Several	  participants	  made	  comments	  about	  the	  morphs	  in	  this	  pair,	  saying	  that	  quite	  often	  the	  models	  looked	  uneasy	  or	  slightly	  worried,	  even	  at	  low	  percentages	  of	  fear,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  strong	  tendency	  to	  respond	  ‘fear’	  in	  this	  emotion	  pair.	  Interestingly,	  participants	  often	  showed	  a	  bias	  towards	  one	  emotion	  for	  three	  out	  of	  the	  four	  model	  types,	  and	  towards	  the	  other	  for	  the	  remaining	  model	  type.	  This	  pattern	  of	  responding	  was	  not	  uncommon,	  and	  occurred	  in	  most	  emotion	  pairs.	  Contrary	  to	  our	  prediction,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  offenders	  showed	  a	  stronger	  bias	  toward	  positive	  emotions	  than	  non-­‐offenders.	  Both	  groups	  showed	  similar	  levels	  of	  bias	  towards	  responding	  happiness	  in	  two	  out	  the	  three	  emotion	  pairs	  containing	  the	  emotion.	  	  	  
4.2.2	  Discriminability	  
	   When	  responses	  were	  averaged	  across	  emotion	  pairs,	  non-­‐offenders	  were	  significantly	  better	  at	  discriminating	  between	  emotions	  than	  non-­‐offenders.	  This	  finding	  supports	  our	  hypothesis	  that	  offenders	  would	  show	  more	  difficulty	  discriminating	  between	  emotions	  than	  a	  comparable	  group	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  and	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  (Gery	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Hudson	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Oliver	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Robinson	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  group	  differences	  in	  individual	  emotion	  pairs,	  however	  the	  difference	  in	  discriminability	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair	  was	  the	  largest	  (p	  =	  .06);	  non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  1.68)	  were	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  than	  offenders	  (M	  =	  1.44).	  Interestingly,	  both	  groups	  performed	  worse	  in	  emotion	  pairs	  containing	  fear,	  and	  this	  was	  particularly	  evident	  for	  the	  offenders,	  whose	  average	  discriminability	  for	  the	  three	  emotion	  pairs	  containing	  fear	  was	  1.57	  and	  for	  the	  remaining	  three	  pairs	  1.90	  (non-­‐offenders	  were	  1.69	  and	  1.97	  respectively).	  This	  finding	  in	  particular	  may	  have	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clinical	  implications	  as	  a	  study	  by	  Marsh,	  Kozak,	  and	  Ambady	  (2007)	  suggests	  a	  link	  between	  accurate	  recognition	  of	  fear	  and	  prosocial	  behaviour,	  and	  multiple	  studies	  have	  shown	  a	  link	  between	  inaccurate	  recognition	  of	  fear	  and	  antisocial	  behaviour	  (Marsh	  &	  Blair,	  2008).	  	  On	  average,	  non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  1.81)	  were	  better	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  emotions	  in	  child	  faces	  than	  offenders	  (M	  =	  1.72),	  particularly	  female	  children,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  .084).	  When	  analysed	  by	  emotion	  pair,	  offenders	  had	  higher	  discriminability	  when	  judging	  male	  children	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  and	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pairs,	  although	  these	  differences	  were	  relatively	  small.	  In	  all	  other	  emotion	  pairs,	  non-­‐offenders	  had	  higher	  discriminability	  for	  child	  faces.	  In	  particular,	  there	  were	  large	  differences	  between	  the	  groups	  in	  the	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  (non-­‐offenders	  M	  =	  1.62,	  offenders	  M	  =	  1.38,	  p	  =	  .062)	  and	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  (non-­‐offenders	  M	  =	  1.70,	  offenders	  M	  =	  1.55,	  p	  =	  .190)	  emotion	  pairs.	  This	  finding	  largely	  supports	  our	  hypothesis	  that	  offenders	  would	  show	  more	  difficulty	  in	  discriminating	  between	  emotions	  in	  children,	  relative	  to	  non-­‐offenders.	  However,	  neither	  group	  performed	  significantly	  better	  with	  adult	  faces	  than	  child	  faces.	  Overall,	  participants	  were	  generally	  able	  to	  discriminate	  well	  between	  the	  two	  emotions	  in	  each	  pair.	  However,	  model	  age	  and	  sex	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  participants’	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  in	  four	  of	  the	  six	  emotion	  pairs.	  However,	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  no	  consistent	  pattern	  to	  these	  differences	  and	  overall	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  average	  discriminability	  of	  adult	  and	  child,	  or	  male	  and	  female	  faces.	  	  
4.2.3	  Accuracy	  
	   When	  responses	  were	  averaged	  across	  all	  emotion	  pairs,	  a	  systematic	  increase	  was	  seen	  over	  the	  first	  three	  blocks	  of	  trials	  from	  both	  groups.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  participants	  becoming	  familiar	  with	  the	  task	  over	  this	  time.	  Accuracy	  scores	  peaked	  in	  the	  final	  block	  of	  trials	  for	  both	  groups,	  with	  non-­‐offenders	  at	  87.18%	  and	  offenders	  at	  85.47%.	  A	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  emotion	  pair	  was	  found,	  which	  showed	  that	  accuracy	  was	  dependent	  on	  which	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two	  emotions	  were	  being	  discriminated	  between.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  accuracy	  scores	  were	  also	  analysed	  separately	  for	  each	  of	  the	  six	  emotion	  pairs.	  Overall,	  accuracy	  scores	  were	  largely	  similar	  for	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders,	  although	  both	  groups	  performed	  better	  in	  some	  emotion	  pairs	  than	  others.	  In	  particular,	  offenders	  performed	  particularly	  poorly	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair,	  although	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  .054).	  Accuracy	  was	  significantly	  higher	  for	  both	  groups	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  (90.64%)	  and	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  (91.60%)	  pairs	  than	  the	  other	  four	  emotion	  pairs.	  Suggesting	  that	  both	  groups	  found	  it	  easier	  to	  judge	  the	  faces	  when	  they	  were	  selecting	  between	  emotions	  of	  opposite	  valence,	  as	  would	  be	  expected.	  In	  contrast,	  accuracy	  was	  much	  lower	  in	  the	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  (80.90%)	  pair.	  	  	  
4.2.4	  Covariates	  and	  psychometrics	  
	  	   Due	  to	  the	  significant	  differences	  between	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  on	  the	  demographic	  measures	  of	  age,	  education,	  and	  socioeconomic	  status	  (SES),	  we	  performed	  an	  ANCOVA	  with	  these	  as	  covariates	  for	  bias	  scores	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair	  and	  overall	  discriminability	  scores.	  None	  of	  the	  demographic	  measures	  were	  significant	  covariates	  for	  bias	  scores,	  suggesting	  our	  initial	  finding	  was	  robust	  and	  not	  due	  to	  the	  significant	  demographic	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  However,	  for	  overall	  discriminability	  scores,	  age	  was	  a	  significant	  covariate,	  and	  this	  caused	  the	  difference	  in	  discriminability	  to	  no	  longer	  be	  significant.	  This	  result	  is	  in	  line	  with	  previous	  research,	  as	  our	  sample	  of	  offenders	  performed	  significantly	  poorer	  on	  the	  task	  and	  were	  significantly	  older	  than	  the	  non-­‐offenders	  (M	  =	  46.37	  and	  25.67	  years	  respectively)	  supporting	  the	  theory	  that	  emotion	  recognition	  ability	  decreases	  as	  we	  age,	  particularly	  once	  we	  pass	  40	  years	  of	  age	  (Calder	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Kessels	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Ruffman	  et	  al.,	  2008)..	  In	  addition,	  the	  group	  difference	  was	  also	  not	  significant	  when	  level	  of	  education	  was	  used	  as	  a	  covariate,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Kessels	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  who	  found	  that	  years	  of	  education	  was	  significantly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  recognition	  of	  fear,	  happiness,	  sadness,	  and	  total	  score	  on	  their	  emotion	  recognition	  task.	  Additionally,	  Oliver	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  found	  that	  recognition	  accuracy	  of	  fear	  and	  surprise	  was	  significantly	  affected	  by	  IQ.	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Finally,	  ethnicity	  was	  also	  used	  as	  a	  separate	  covariate	  but	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  bias	  or	  discriminability	  in	  any	  of	  the	  emotion	  pairs.	  	   Previous	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  IQ	  and	  psychopathy	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  emotion	  recognition	  (Hastings,	  Tangney,	  &	  Stuewig,	  2008;	  Oliver	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Adams	  (2012)	  provided	  support	  for	  this	  view.	  Specifically,	  she	  found	  a	  large	  negative	  correlation	  between	  psychopathy	  and	  fear	  processing	  in	  male	  youth,	  suggesting	  that	  psychopathic	  male	  individuals	  have	  a	  deficit	  that	  prevents	  them	  from	  recognizing	  fear	  or	  distress	  in	  others,	  which	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  inhibiting	  aggressive	  behaviour.	  Montagne,	  van	  Honk,	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  similar	  results	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  male	  and	  female	  university	  students	  who	  scored	  highly	  on	  psychopathic	  personality	  characteristics.	  Interestingly,	  this	  deficit	  was	  not	  apparent	  when	  making	  judgments	  of	  faces	  in	  side	  profile.	  However,	  Montagne,	  van	  Honk,	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  did	  not	  test	  for	  sex	  differences	  and	  this	  may	  have	  affected	  their	  results	  as	  Montagne,	  Kessels,	  Frigerio,	  de	  Haan,	  and	  Perrett	  (2005)	  found	  that	  male	  university	  students	  were	  both	  less	  accurate	  and	  less	  sensitive	  in	  labeling	  facial	  expressions	  than	  female	  university	  students,	  although	  neither	  study	  used	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  participants,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  effects	  may	  dissipate	  with	  age	  (Rahman,	  Wilson,	  &	  Abrahams,	  2004).	  Hastings	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  also	  found	  a	  relationship	  between	  psychopathy	  and	  a	  deficit	  in	  recognition	  of	  facial	  expressions,	  although	  this	  was	  most	  notable	  for	  happy	  and	  sad	  expressions	  and	  not	  fearful	  ones.	  	   Interestingly,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  enough	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  either	  IQ	  or	  psychopathy	  should	  be	  used	  as	  covariates	  in	  our	  analyses.	  Both	  measures	  were	  only	  each	  correlated	  with	  one	  of	  the	  signal	  detection	  measures	  in	  one	  emotion	  pair.	  In	  any	  case,	  we	  were	  only	  able	  to	  obtain	  IQ	  scores	  for	  offenders	  and	  psychopathy	  scores	  for	  non-­‐offenders,	  so	  were	  unable	  to	  use	  these	  measures	  as	  covariates	  in	  the	  between-­‐group	  analyses.	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.3	  Validity	  of	  using	  posed	  expressions	  
	  	   As	  mentioned	  previously,	  participant	  responses	  varied	  depending	  on	  not	  only	  the	  emotions	  displayed,	  but	  also	  the	  sex	  and	  age	  of	  the	  model	  expressing	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the	  emotion.	  These	  differences	  were	  not	  systematic	  which	  makes	  interpretation	  difficult.	  However,	  several	  explanations	  will	  be	  examined	  below.	  	  
4.3.1	  Sex	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  emotions	  are	  expressed	  
	   Some	  studies	  have	  found	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  males	  and	  females	  display	  emotion	  via	  facial	  expressions.	  For	  example,	  Friedman,	  Riggio,	  and	  Segall	  (1980)	  had	  judges	  rate	  videos	  of	  participants	  reading	  neutral	  sentences	  while	  portraying	  one	  of	  six	  basic	  emotions.	  They	  found	  that	  females	  were	  better	  at	  enacting	  anger,	  happiness,	  surprise,	  and	  disgust	  than	  males,	  although	  this	  difference	  was	  only	  significant	  for	  anger	  expressions.	  Wagner,	  MacDonald,	  and	  Manstead	  (1986)	  also	  found	  sex	  differences	  in	  the	  displaying	  of	  facial	  expressions.	  In	  their	  study,	  participants	  (senders)	  were	  covertly	  videotaped	  while	  they	  viewed	  emotionally	  loaded	  photographic	  slides.	  Following	  each	  slide,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  indicate	  which	  of	  the	  seven	  basic	  emotions	  best	  described	  their	  reaction,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pleasantness	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  reaction.	  The	  videos	  were	  then	  rated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  by	  a	  separate	  group	  of	  people	  (receivers).	  Wagner	  et	  al.	  (1986)	  found	  several	  interesting	  results:	  First,	  male	  receivers’	  judgments	  of	  anger	  significantly	  exceeded	  chance	  levels,	  whereas	  female	  receivers’	  judgments	  did	  not.	  Second,	  male	  senders	  were	  correctly	  judged	  significantly	  above	  chance	  levels	  when	  they	  expressed	  sadness,	  disgust,	  anger,	  and	  happiness,	  but	  significantly	  below	  chance	  levels	  when	  they	  expressed	  surprise.	  Female	  senders	  were	  correctly	  judged	  significantly	  above	  chance	  levels	  when	  they	  expressed	  disgust,	  anger,	  and	  happiness.	  Finally,	  male	  and	  female	  senders	  were	  correctly	  judged	  at	  significantly	  different	  levels	  when	  expressing	  sadness	  (21.84%	  and	  10.43%	  respectively)	  and	  surprise	  (4.40%	  and	  19.18%	  respectively).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  our	  sample	  of	  men	  may	  naturally	  have	  been	  more	  sensitive	  to	  expressions	  of	  anger,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  influenced	  in	  their	  responding	  by	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  model	  they	  were	  judging	  and	  the	  emotion	  being	  expressed.	  Indeed,	  we	  did	  find	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  discriminability	  of	  male	  and	  female	  faces	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  and	  Anger-­‐Happiness	  emotion	  pairs.	  Participants	  were	  significantly	  more	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  sadness	  and	  anger,	  and	  anger	  and	  happiness	  when	  judging	  female	  faces	  (M	  =	  1.74	  and	  2.18	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respectively)	  than	  when	  judging	  male	  faces	  (M	  =	  1.50	  and	  2.02,	  ps	  =	  .008	  and	  .009	  respectively).	  However,	  there	  were	  no	  such	  differences	  in	  the	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  or	  Sadness-­‐Happiness	  emotion	  pairs.	  	  	   Additionally,	  Wallbott	  (1988)	  had	  judges	  rate	  short	  clips	  of	  actors	  expressing	  emotion	  in	  movies.	  He	  found	  that	  female	  actors	  were	  able	  to	  communicate	  sadness	  and	  fear	  significantly	  better	  than	  male	  actors,	  but	  were	  significantly	  worse	  at	  communicating	  anger.	  These	  results	  reflect	  the	  gender	  stereotypes	  that	  males	  should	  not	  cry	  and	  that	  females	  should	  not	  express	  feelings	  of	  anger	  openly	  (Wallbott,	  1988).	  We	  did	  not	  find	  any	  evidence	  that	  participants	  found	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  recognise	  anger	  when	  expressed	  by	  female	  models.	  However,	  we	  did	  find	  that	  both	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  bias	  towards	  responding	  ‘anger’	  when	  judging	  female	  faces	  but	  not	  male	  faces	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair,	  which	  may	  indicate	  that	  our	  sample	  of	  men	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  judge	  anger	  in	  women	  than	  in	  other	  men.	  	  	  
4.3.2	  Differences	  between	  genuine	  and	  posed	  expressions	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  expression	  of	  emotion	  due	  to	  sex,	  sincerity	  also	  affects	  how	  accurately	  an	  emotion	  is	  expressed.	  Gosselin,	  Kirouac,	  and	  Doré	  (1995)	  had	  actors	  perform	  scenarios,	  which	  were	  written	  to	  elicit	  one	  of	  six	  emotions.	  Each	  actor	  performed	  each	  scenario	  twice,	  once	  while	  trying	  to	  feel	  the	  emotion	  of	  the	  character	  they	  were	  playing	  (EFE	  condition),	  and	  once	  without	  feeling	  the	  emotion	  (EUE	  condition).	  These	  sessions	  were	  rated	  by	  the	  actors	  themselves	  three	  times	  (immediately	  after	  each	  portrayal,	  after	  each	  session,	  and	  two	  months	  later),	  and	  once	  by	  independent	  judges.	  Only	  successful	  portrayals	  were	  used	  in	  the	  study	  and	  these	  were	  scored	  using	  the	  Facial	  Action	  Coding	  System	  (FACS;	  Ekman	  &	  Friesen,	  1978).	  Gosselin,	  Kirouac,	  and	  Doré	  (1995)	  found	  that	  portrayals	  of	  happiness,	  anger,	  and	  sadness	  in	  the	  EFE	  condition	  were	  significantly	  closer	  to	  genuine	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  than	  portrayals	  of	  these	  emotions	  in	  the	  EUE	  condition.	  This	  result	  is	  important	  for	  the	  present	  study	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  images	  we	  used	  were	  of	  actors	  expressing	  these	  three	  emotions	  (as	  well	  as	  fear).	  Indeed,	  in	  their	  validation	  of	  the	  Radboud	  database,	  Langner	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  found	  that	  raters	  had	  an	  overall	  agreement	  rate	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of	  82%.	  Although	  the	  authors	  claim	  that	  this	  is	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  agreement	  compared	  to	  other	  such	  databases,	  it	  still	  leaves	  room	  for	  differences	  in	  responding	  purely	  based	  on	  how	  well	  the	  models	  have	  expressed	  the	  emotions,	  which	  may	  impact	  the	  results	  of	  research	  utilising	  this	  database,	  even	  if	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  sincerity,	  control	  over	  our	  own	  facial	  muscles	  is	  another	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  success	  of	  posed	  expressions.	  Mehu,	  Mortillaro,	  Bänziger,	  and	  Scherer	  (2012)	  identified	  two	  subsets	  of	  facial	  action	  units	  (AUs;	  the	  individual	  muscle	  movements	  that	  make	  up	  facial	  expressions):	  reliable	  AUs	  and	  versatile	  AUs.	  While	  versatile	  AUs	  are	  easily	  manipulated,	  reliable	  AUs	  are	  not	  readily	  subject	  to	  volitional	  control	  (Ekman,	  2001;	  2003a).	  FACS	  experts	  rate	  reliable	  AUs	  as	  being	  significantly	  less	  controllable	  than	  versatile	  AUs	  (Mehu	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  and	  only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  people	  inexperienced	  with	  FACS	  are	  able	  to	  voluntarily	  perform	  the	  reliable	  AUs	  (Gosselin,	  Perron,	  &	  Beaupré,	  2010).	  Mehu	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  that	  judges	  rated	  expressions	  as	  significantly	  more	  intense,	  authentic	  and	  accurate	  when	  reliable	  AUs	  were	  used	  in	  the	  expression.	  Again,	  these	  findings	  are	  important	  as	  genuine	  expressions	  of	  fear	  and	  happiness	  contain	  both	  reliable	  and	  versatile	  AUs,	  and	  genuine	  expressions	  of	  sadness	  contain	  only	  reliable	  AUs	  (Ekman,	  2003).	  Future	  databases	  would	  benefit	  from	  focusing	  on	  training	  models	  to	  pose	  reliable	  AUs	  as	  well	  as	  taking	  steps	  to	  ensure	  models	  expressions	  appear	  as	  genuine	  as	  possible,	  therefore	  improving	  research	  that	  require	  the	  use	  of	  such	  databases.	  	  	  
4.4	  Processing	  of	  angry	  faces	  and	  parallels	  to	  studies	  with	  abused	  children	  
	  	   Offenders	  in	  particular	  struggled	  to	  discriminate	  between	  anger	  and	  fear,	  as	  well	  as	  anger	  and	  sadness.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  participants	  had	  trouble	  with	  the	  Anger-­‐Fear	  emotion	  pair	  considering	  the	  difference	  in	  appearance	  of	  the	  face	  expressing	  these	  two	  emotions	  (e.g.	  eyebrows	  raised	  vs.	  eyebrows	  lowered;	  eyes	  wide	  vs.	  eyes	  narrowed),	  such	  low	  accuracy	  rates	  would	  suggest	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  have	  difficulty	  recognising	  both	  anger	  and	  fear,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  difficulty	  in	  discriminating	  between	  the	  two.	  Some	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  do	  have	  difficulty	  recognising	  these	  emotions	  (e.g.	  Gery	  et	  al.,	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2009),	  and	  other	  studies	  suggest	  that	  children	  who	  have	  been	  abused	  or	  have	  behavioural	  problems	  also	  have	  difficulty	  recognising	  anger	  and	  fear	  expressions	  (Blair	  &	  Coles,	  2000;	  Jonson-­‐Reid	  &	  Way,	  2001).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  these	  studies	  with	  abused	  children	  as	  it	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  adult	  sexual	  offenders	  were	  abused	  themselves	  during	  their	  childhood	  (Burton,	  2000;	  Graham,	  Kimonis,	  Wasserman,	  &	  Kline,	  2012).	  	  	  
4.4.1	  Abuse	  histories	  of	  sexual	  offenders	  
	  
	   While	  a	  history	  of	  childhood	  abuse	  by	  no	  means	  cements	  a	  child	  into	  a	  life	  of	  sexually	  abusing	  others,	  the	  literature	  on	  sexual	  offenders	  has	  predominantly	  shown	  that	  children	  who	  have	  been	  abused	  are	  at	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  subsequent	  sexual	  offending	  (Starzyk	  &	  Marshall,	  2003).	  In	  addition,	  childhood	  sexual	  abuse	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  these	  children	  not	  developing	  necessary	  coping	  strategies,	  as	  well	  as	  putting	  them	  at	  increased	  risk	  of	  developing	  general	  behaviour	  problems,	  poor	  self-­‐esteem,	  fear,	  and	  depression	  (Kendall-­‐Tackett,	  Williams,	  &	  Finkelhor,	  1993).	  The	  rates	  of	  childhood	  abuse	  in	  adult	  sexual	  offenders	  vary	  from	  study	  to	  study,	  with	  numbers	  as	  high	  as	  75%,	  although	  Barbaree,	  Marshall,	  and	  McCormick	  (1998)	  found	  an	  average	  of	  28%	  in	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  across	  several	  studies.	  J.	  S.	  Levenson,	  Willis,	  and	  Prescott	  (2014)	  found	  that	  sexual	  offenders	  were	  twice	  as	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  sexually	  abused	  themselves	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  based	  on	  responses	  to	  the	  Adverse	  Childhood	  Experience	  (ACE)	  questionnaire.	  Sexual	  offenders	  reported	  significantly	  more	  adverse	  experiences	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  with	  odds	  ratios	  ranging	  from	  1.58	  to	  13.88.	  Only	  16%	  of	  the	  sexual	  offenders	  reported	  no	  adverse	  childhood	  experiences,	  whereas	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  reported	  this.	  In	  addition,	  nearly	  half	  of	  sexual	  offenders	  endorsed	  four	  or	  more	  items	  on	  the	  ACE,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  offenders	  were	  raised	  in	  a	  dysfunctional	  environment	  with	  negative	  role	  models,	  that	  was	  not	  conducive	  to	  positive	  development.	  Higher	  ACE	  scores	  are	  also	  associated	  with	  more	  serious	  and	  frequent	  sexual	  abuse.	  Other	  studies	  have	  also	  found	  higher	  rates	  of	  childhood	  sexual	  abuse	  in	  child	  sex	  offenders	  relative	  to	  the	  general	  population	  (Jespersen,	  Lalumière,	  &	  Seto,	  2009;	  Reavis,	  Looman,	  Franco,	  &	  Rojas,	  2013).	  Additionally,	  Reavis	  et	  al.	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(2013)	  suggest	  that	  treatment	  interventions	  for	  offenders	  that	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  alleviate	  the	  neurobiologic	  wounds	  caused	  by	  childhood	  abuse	  are	  “…destined	  to	  fail.”	  (Reavis	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  p.	  47).	  	  
	  
4.4.2	  Studies	  with	  children	  
	  	   Having	  identified	  that	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  sexual	  offenders	  in	  the	  general	  population	  were	  themselves	  abused	  as	  children,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  if	  this	  may	  have	  influenced	  how	  the	  offenders	  responded	  to	  the	  stimuli.	  Using	  a	  procedure	  similar	  to	  the	  present	  study,	  Pollak	  and	  Kistler	  (2002)	  created	  morphed	  expressions	  in	  10%	  increments	  (using	  happiness,	  sadness,	  fear,	  and	  anger)	  that	  lay	  on	  a	  continuum	  from	  one	  emotion	  to	  a	  second	  emotion.	  However,	  they	  only	  created	  four	  of	  the	  six	  possible	  continua	  (they	  did	  not	  use	  Sadness-­‐Fear	  or	  Happiness-­‐Anger).	  Children	  who	  had	  been	  abused	  overidentified	  anger	  relative	  to	  fear	  and	  sadness,	  whereas	  control	  children	  underidentified	  anger.	  This	  difference	  was	  most	  pronounced	  for	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  continuum,	  where	  abused	  children	  showed	  a	  strong	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  an	  emotion	  as	  anger	  and	  control	  children	  showed	  a	  strong	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  an	  emotion	  as	  fear.	  These	  results	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  present	  study,	  as	  we	  found	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  showed	  a	  significantly	  stronger	  bias	  towards	  labeling	  an	  emotion	  as	  fear	  when	  judging	  male	  faces	  than	  offenders	  in	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pair.	  Pollak	  and	  Sinha	  (2002)	  found	  a	  similar	  result,	  albeit	  with	  a	  slightly	  different	  procedure.	  They	  used	  a	  random	  image	  structure	  evolution	  (RISE)	  procedure	  to	  create	  a	  continuum	  of	  images	  that	  ranged	  from	  a	  scrambled	  face	  to	  a	  clear	  face	  expressing	  an	  emotion.	  Again,	  abused	  children	  were	  significantly	  more	  sensitive	  to	  anger	  expressions,	  with	  higher	  accuracy	  rates	  than	  control	  children	  across	  the	  entire	  continua	  (i.e.	  abused	  children	  needed	  less	  information	  to	  identify	  an	  angry	  expression	  than	  control	  children),	  although	  this	  was	  not	  due	  to	  a	  response	  bias	  for	  anger	  unlike	  the	  findings	  of	  Pollak	  and	  Kistler	  (2002).	  The	  opposite	  result	  was	  found	  for	  sad	  expressions,	  with	  control	  children	  showing	  higher	  accuracy	  than	  abused	  children.	  Pollak,	  Messner,	  Kistler,	  and	  Cohn	  (2009)	  also	  found	  that	  abused	  children	  were	  more	  sensitive	  to	  angry	  expressions	  than	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expressions	  even	  when	  few	  physiological	  clues	  were	  available	  to	  them.	  Their	  reaction	  times	  were	  also	  related	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  abuse	  they	  had	  suffered.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  for	  these	  results	  is	  that	  abused	  children	  display	  increases	  in	  the	  amplitude	  of	  the	  event-­‐related	  potential	  (ERP)	  component	  P3b	  relative	  to	  control	  children	  and	  adults	  when	  actively	  searching	  for	  angry	  faces,	  but	  not	  other	  emotional	  expressions	  (Pollak	  &	  Tolley-­‐Schell,	  2003).	  Pollak	  and	  Tolley-­‐Schell	  (2003)	  took	  this	  one	  step	  further	  by	  testing	  abused	  children’s	  ability	  to	  disengage	  attention	  from	  angry	  facial	  cues.	  To	  do	  this	  they	  adapted	  a	  visual	  selective	  attention	  paradigm	  to	  include	  an	  affective	  component.	  Abused	  children	  responded	  faster	  to	  valid	  angry	  trials	  than	  they	  did	  to	  valid	  happy	  trials,	  with	  no	  loss	  of	  accuracy.	  In	  fact,	  abused	  children	  responded	  faster	  to	  valid	  angry	  trials	  than	  control	  children	  responded	  to	  either	  valid	  angry	  or	  happy	  trials.	  These	  results	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  pattern	  of	  responding	  shown	  by	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  in	  this	  study.	  Without	  having	  information	  on	  the	  histories	  of	  the	  offenders	  who	  participated,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  speculate	  on	  the	  reasons	  behind	  their	  responding.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  offenders	  had	  been	  abused	  as	  children,	  and	  as	  discussed	  above	  this	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  discriminate	  between	  anger	  and	  other	  negative	  emotions	  (offenders’	  accuracy	  was	  lowest	  for	  both	  the	  Fear-­‐Anger	  and	  Sadness-­‐Anger	  emotion	  pairs,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  studies	  with	  abused	  children).	  In	  addition,	  offenders	  are	  likely	  to	  encounter	  anger	  in	  the	  prison	  environment	  much	  more	  regularly	  than	  non-­‐offenders	  would	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  non-­‐offenders	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  avoid	  confrontation	  and	  the	  negative	  consequences	  that	  can	  come	  with	  anger,	  such	  as	  violence	  and	  the	  body’s	  fight	  or	  flight	  response.	  In	  support	  of	  this,	  Seidel,	  Habel,	  Kirschner,	  Gur,	  and	  Derntl	  (2010)	  found	  that	  anger	  expressions	  tended	  to	  elicit	  avoidance	  behaviours	  from	  a	  sample	  of	  university	  students.	  In	  addition,	  they	  also	  found	  that	  participants	  responded	  faster	  to	  male	  faces	  when	  responses	  were	  made	  with	  a	  pushing	  motion	  (avoidance)	  than	  when	  a	  pulling	  motion	  (approach)	  was	  used,	  and	  the	  opposite	  was	  found	  for	  female	  faces.	  As	  would	  be	  expected,	  male	  angry	  faces	  were	  responded	  to	  significantly	  faster	  than	  female	  angry	  faces.	  Interestingly,	  Krieglmeyer	  and	  Deutsch	  (2013)	  found	  that	  angry	  faces	  can	  facilitate	  both	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approach	  and	  avoidance,	  depending	  on	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  individual	  making	  the	  behaviours.	  	  
4.5	  Limitations	  
	   There	  were	  several	  limitations	  in	  this	  study.	  Firstly,	  Offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders	  differed	  significantly	  on	  every	  demographic	  measure	  we	  obtained	  (age,	  education,	  socioeconomic	  status).	  This	  was	  anticipated	  as	  we	  were	  unable	  a	  matched-­‐control	  design	  was	  impractical	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  	  However,	  given	  that	  offenders	  were	  significantly	  older	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  had	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  education	  overall.	  Significant	  education	  reforms	  were	  undertaken	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  late	  1980’s,	  and	  these	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  decline	  in	  ‘blue	  collar’	  jobs	  and	  a	  rise	  in	  ‘white	  collar’	  jobs	  (Boston,	  Martin,	  Pallot,	  &	  Walsh,	  1996).	  Attitudes	  towards	  tertiary	  education	  became	  more	  positive	  and	  student	  numbers	  more	  than	  doubled	  over	  a	  15-­‐year	  period,	  and	  have	  continued	  to	  rise	  steadily	  since	  (McLaughlin,	  2003).	  	  The	  experimental	  design,	  which	  underwent	  several	  revisions,	  could	  also	  be	  another	  source	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  differences.	  In	  particular,	  many	  participants	  mentioned	  that	  they	  did	  not	  see	  the	  emotion	  that	  the	  face	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  showing,	  even	  in	  practice	  trials,	  which	  did	  not	  use	  morphed	  expressions.	  While	  the	  Radboud	  Faces	  Database	  (RaFD;	  Langner	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  which	  we	  used	  to	  obtain	  the	  images	  has	  been	  validated	  in	  several	  studies,	  there	  was	  large	  variability	  in	  the	  way	  emotions	  were	  expressed	  on	  the	  faces	  of	  the	  models,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intensity.	  Morphing	  the	  images	  was	  also	  difficult	  with	  certain	  images,	  as	  in	  some	  cases	  where	  the	  models	  had	  their	  faces	  tilted	  forward	  or	  backward	  for	  one	  emotion,	  and	  then	  were	  sitting	  with	  their	  heads	  level	  for	  another,	  and	  this	  undoubtedly	  reduced	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  morphs.	  In	  addition,	  the	  morphing	  software	  (Fantamorph)	  produced	  inconsistent	  results.	  Morphs	  generally	  resembled	  the	  second	  image	  more	  than	  the	  first	  at	  the	  50%	  point	  on	  the	  continuum,	  and	  this	  was	  most	  evident	  when	  pairing	  happiness	  with	  the	  other	  emotions.	  Several	  participants	  mentioned	  that	  they	  saw	  very	  little	  happiness	  in	  any	  of	  the	  faces	  in	  the	  Happiness-­‐Fear	  emotion	  pair	  (interestingly,	  this	  emotion	  pair	  had	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  hit	  rates	  and	  lowest	  false	  alarm	  rates).	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Finally,	  we	  were	  only	  able	  to	  obtain	  IQ	  scores	  for	  offenders,	  and	  psychopathy	  scores	  for	  non-­‐offenders.	  This	  may	  have	  affected	  the	  results	  we	  obtained	  when	  analysing	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  measures	  and	  responding,	  because	  statistical	  power	  was	  limited	  and	  we	  were	  unable	  to	  use	  these	  as	  covariates	  in	  the	  betwee-­‐groups	  analyses.	  	  	  These	  limitations	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  future	  research,	  and	  it	  may	  also	  be	  wise	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  dynamic	  morphing	  procedure,	  so	  that	  faces	  display	  a	  natural	  change	  from	  neutral	  to	  an	  emotion	  and	  back	  to	  neutral	  or	  to	  another	  emotion,	  which	  is	  more	  realistic	  and	  would	  mimic	  the	  changes	  seen	  in	  real	  world	  settings.	  	  	  
4.6	  Implications	  and	  future	  research	  
	   Unfortunately,	  relatively	  little	  research	  has	  been	  conducted	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  even	  less	  using	  faces	  of	  children.	  This	  study	  should	  encourage	  future	  research	  into	  this	  area	  as	  it	  has	  large	  implications	  for	  the	  real	  world	  treatment	  of	  sexual	  offenders.	  The	  current	  research	  did	  indicate	  that	  to	  some	  degree	  offenders	  had	  more	  difficulty	  discriminating	  between	  some	  emotion	  pairs	  than	  non-­‐offenders,	  particularly	  when	  fear	  was	  one	  of	  the	  emotions,	  showing	  that	  deficits	  may	  exist	  that	  could	  have	  predisposed	  them	  to	  offending.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  differences	  between	  offenders	  and	  non-­‐offenders,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  either	  group	  did	  not	  show	  any	  deficits	  in	  recognition	  accuracy.	  Hit	  rates	  varied	  between	  75%	  and	  87%,	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  varied	  between	  19%	  and	  37%,	  evidence	  that	  the	  accuracy	  of	  responding	  was	  far	  from	  perfect.	  Future	  research	  should	  also	  investigate	  potential	  links	  between	  recognition	  accuracy	  and	  re-­‐offending	  in	  child	  sexual	  offenders.	  Results	  of	  future	  research	  in	  this	  area	  could	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  treatment	  programmes,	  particularly	  if	  any	  deficits	  in	  recognising	  facial	  expressions	  of	  children	  are	  found	  in	  the	  child	  sexual	  offender	  group.	  If	  sexual	  offenders	  have	  a	  greater	  difficulty	  recognising	  emotions	  in	  children	  than	  in	  adults,	  it	  would	  likely	  benefit	  them	  to	  undergo	  training	  to	  improve	  their	  recognition	  accuracy	  (of	  fearful	  expressions	  in	  particular)	  as	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  sex	  offenders	  to	  incorrectly	  interpret	  negative	  facial	  expressions	  as	  sexual	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Appendix A – Supplementary Material: Morph Selection 
 
Sadness-Anger 
         
 
Sadness-Fear 
         
 
Sadness-Happiness 
         
 
Fear-Anger 
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Happiness-Fear 
         
 
Anger-Happiness 
         
 
 
